| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only |
| /* |
| * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation |
| * |
| * Author: |
| * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> |
| * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com> |
| * |
| * File: evm_main.c |
| * implements evm_inode_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr, |
| * evm_inode_removexattr, and evm_verifyxattr |
| */ |
| |
| #define pr_fmt(fmt) "EVM: "fmt |
| |
| #include <linux/init.h> |
| #include <linux/crypto.h> |
| #include <linux/audit.h> |
| #include <linux/xattr.h> |
| #include <linux/integrity.h> |
| #include <linux/evm.h> |
| #include <linux/magic.h> |
| #include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h> |
| |
| #include <crypto/hash.h> |
| #include <crypto/hash_info.h> |
| #include <crypto/algapi.h> |
| #include "evm.h" |
| |
| int evm_initialized; |
| |
| static const char * const integrity_status_msg[] = { |
| "pass", "pass_immutable", "fail", "fail_immutable", "no_label", |
| "no_xattrs", "unknown" |
| }; |
| int evm_hmac_attrs; |
| |
| static struct xattr_list evm_config_default_xattrnames[] = { |
| {.name = XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX |
| .enabled = true |
| #endif |
| }, |
| {.name = XATTR_NAME_SMACK, |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK |
| .enabled = true |
| #endif |
| }, |
| {.name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, |
| #ifdef CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS |
| .enabled = true |
| #endif |
| }, |
| {.name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, |
| #ifdef CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS |
| .enabled = true |
| #endif |
| }, |
| {.name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, |
| #ifdef CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS |
| .enabled = true |
| #endif |
| }, |
| {.name = XATTR_NAME_APPARMOR, |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR |
| .enabled = true |
| #endif |
| }, |
| {.name = XATTR_NAME_IMA, |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE |
| .enabled = true |
| #endif |
| }, |
| {.name = XATTR_NAME_CAPS, |
| .enabled = true |
| }, |
| }; |
| |
| LIST_HEAD(evm_config_xattrnames); |
| |
| static int evm_fixmode __ro_after_init; |
| static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str) |
| { |
| if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0) |
| evm_fixmode = 1; |
| else |
| pr_err("invalid \"%s\" mode", str); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| __setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode); |
| |
| static void __init evm_init_config(void) |
| { |
| int i, xattrs; |
| |
| xattrs = ARRAY_SIZE(evm_config_default_xattrnames); |
| |
| pr_info("Initialising EVM extended attributes:\n"); |
| for (i = 0; i < xattrs; i++) { |
| pr_info("%s%s\n", evm_config_default_xattrnames[i].name, |
| !evm_config_default_xattrnames[i].enabled ? |
| " (disabled)" : ""); |
| list_add_tail(&evm_config_default_xattrnames[i].list, |
| &evm_config_xattrnames); |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_EVM_ATTR_FSUUID |
| evm_hmac_attrs |= EVM_ATTR_FSUUID; |
| #endif |
| pr_info("HMAC attrs: 0x%x\n", evm_hmac_attrs); |
| } |
| |
| static bool evm_key_loaded(void) |
| { |
| return (bool)(evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This function determines whether or not it is safe to ignore verification |
| * errors, based on the ability of EVM to calculate HMACs. If the HMAC key |
| * is not loaded, and it cannot be loaded in the future due to the |
| * EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE initialization flag, allowing an operation despite the |
| * attrs/xattrs being found invalid will not make them valid. |
| */ |
| static bool evm_hmac_disabled(void) |
| { |
| if (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) |
| return false; |
| |
| if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE)) |
| return false; |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry) |
| { |
| struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); |
| struct xattr_list *xattr; |
| int error; |
| int count = 0; |
| |
| if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) |
| return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
| |
| list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) { |
| error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, xattr->name, NULL, 0); |
| if (error < 0) { |
| if (error == -ENODATA) |
| continue; |
| return error; |
| } |
| count++; |
| } |
| |
| return count; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * evm_verify_hmac - calculate and compare the HMAC with the EVM xattr |
| * |
| * Compute the HMAC on the dentry's protected set of extended attributes |
| * and compare it against the stored security.evm xattr. |
| * |
| * For performance: |
| * - use the previoulsy retrieved xattr value and length to calculate the |
| * HMAC.) |
| * - cache the verification result in the iint, when available. |
| * |
| * Returns integrity status |
| */ |
| static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, |
| const char *xattr_name, |
| char *xattr_value, |
| size_t xattr_value_len, |
| struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) |
| { |
| struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL; |
| struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr; |
| enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; |
| struct evm_digest digest; |
| struct inode *inode; |
| int rc, xattr_len, evm_immutable = 0; |
| |
| if (iint && (iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS || |
| iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE)) |
| return iint->evm_status; |
| |
| /* if status is not PASS, try to check again - against -ENOMEM */ |
| |
| /* first need to know the sig type */ |
| rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, |
| (char **)&xattr_data, 0, GFP_NOFS); |
| if (rc <= 0) { |
| evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; |
| if (rc == -ENODATA) { |
| rc = evm_find_protected_xattrs(dentry); |
| if (rc > 0) |
| evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL; |
| else if (rc == 0) |
| evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS; /* new file */ |
| } else if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) { |
| evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; |
| } |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| xattr_len = rc; |
| |
| /* check value type */ |
| switch (xattr_data->type) { |
| case EVM_XATTR_HMAC: |
| if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_xattr)) { |
| evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| digest.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; |
| rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, |
| xattr_value_len, &digest); |
| if (rc) |
| break; |
| rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->data, digest.digest, |
| SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); |
| if (rc) |
| rc = -EINVAL; |
| break; |
| case EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG: |
| evm_immutable = 1; |
| fallthrough; |
| case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: |
| /* accept xattr with non-empty signature field */ |
| if (xattr_len <= sizeof(struct signature_v2_hdr)) { |
| evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)xattr_data; |
| digest.hdr.algo = hdr->hash_algo; |
| rc = evm_calc_hash(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, |
| xattr_value_len, xattr_data->type, &digest); |
| if (rc) |
| break; |
| rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, |
| (const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len, |
| digest.digest, digest.hdr.length); |
| if (!rc) { |
| inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); |
| |
| if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) { |
| if (iint) |
| iint->flags |= EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG; |
| evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE; |
| } else if (!IS_RDONLY(inode) && |
| !(inode->i_sb->s_readonly_remount) && |
| !IS_IMMUTABLE(inode)) { |
| evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, |
| xattr_value, |
| xattr_value_len); |
| } |
| } |
| break; |
| default: |
| rc = -EINVAL; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| if (rc) { |
| if (rc == -ENODATA) |
| evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS; |
| else if (evm_immutable) |
| evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE; |
| else |
| evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; |
| } |
| pr_debug("digest: (%d) [%*phN]\n", digest.hdr.length, digest.hdr.length, |
| digest.digest); |
| out: |
| if (iint) |
| iint->evm_status = evm_status; |
| kfree(xattr_data); |
| return evm_status; |
| } |
| |
| static int evm_protected_xattr_common(const char *req_xattr_name, |
| bool all_xattrs) |
| { |
| int namelen; |
| int found = 0; |
| struct xattr_list *xattr; |
| |
| namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name); |
| list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) { |
| if (!all_xattrs && !xattr->enabled) |
| continue; |
| |
| if ((strlen(xattr->name) == namelen) |
| && (strncmp(req_xattr_name, xattr->name, namelen) == 0)) { |
| found = 1; |
| break; |
| } |
| if (strncmp(req_xattr_name, |
| xattr->name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN, |
| strlen(req_xattr_name)) == 0) { |
| found = 1; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return found; |
| } |
| |
| static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name) |
| { |
| return evm_protected_xattr_common(req_xattr_name, false); |
| } |
| |
| int evm_protected_xattr_if_enabled(const char *req_xattr_name) |
| { |
| return evm_protected_xattr_common(req_xattr_name, true); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * evm_read_protected_xattrs - read EVM protected xattr names, lengths, values |
| * @dentry: dentry of the read xattrs |
| * @inode: inode of the read xattrs |
| * @buffer: buffer xattr names, lengths or values are copied to |
| * @buffer_size: size of buffer |
| * @type: n: names, l: lengths, v: values |
| * @canonical_fmt: data format (true: little endian, false: native format) |
| * |
| * Read protected xattr names (separated by |), lengths (u32) or values for a |
| * given dentry and return the total size of copied data. If buffer is NULL, |
| * just return the total size. |
| * |
| * Returns the total size on success, a negative value on error. |
| */ |
| int evm_read_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, u8 *buffer, |
| int buffer_size, char type, bool canonical_fmt) |
| { |
| struct xattr_list *xattr; |
| int rc, size, total_size = 0; |
| |
| list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) { |
| rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, d_backing_inode(dentry), |
| xattr->name, NULL, 0); |
| if (rc < 0 && rc == -ENODATA) |
| continue; |
| else if (rc < 0) |
| return rc; |
| |
| switch (type) { |
| case 'n': |
| size = strlen(xattr->name) + 1; |
| if (buffer) { |
| if (total_size) |
| *(buffer + total_size - 1) = '|'; |
| |
| memcpy(buffer + total_size, xattr->name, size); |
| } |
| break; |
| case 'l': |
| size = sizeof(u32); |
| if (buffer) { |
| if (canonical_fmt) |
| rc = (__force int)cpu_to_le32(rc); |
| |
| *(u32 *)(buffer + total_size) = rc; |
| } |
| break; |
| case 'v': |
| size = rc; |
| if (buffer) { |
| rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, |
| d_backing_inode(dentry), xattr->name, |
| buffer + total_size, |
| buffer_size - total_size); |
| if (rc < 0) |
| return rc; |
| } |
| break; |
| default: |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| total_size += size; |
| } |
| |
| return total_size; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * evm_verifyxattr - verify the integrity of the requested xattr |
| * @dentry: object of the verify xattr |
| * @xattr_name: requested xattr |
| * @xattr_value: requested xattr value |
| * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length |
| * |
| * Calculate the HMAC for the given dentry and verify it against the stored |
| * security.evm xattr. For performance, use the xattr value and length |
| * previously retrieved to calculate the HMAC. |
| * |
| * Returns the xattr integrity status. |
| * |
| * This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it |
| * is executed. |
| */ |
| enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, |
| const char *xattr_name, |
| void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len, |
| struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) |
| { |
| if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) |
| return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; |
| |
| if (!iint) { |
| iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry)); |
| if (!iint) |
| return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; |
| } |
| return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, |
| xattr_value_len, iint); |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_verifyxattr); |
| |
| /* |
| * evm_verify_current_integrity - verify the dentry's metadata integrity |
| * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry |
| * |
| * Verify and return the dentry's metadata integrity. The exceptions are |
| * before EVM is initialized or in 'fix' mode. |
| */ |
| static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry) |
| { |
| struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); |
| |
| if (!evm_key_loaded() || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode) |
| return INTEGRITY_PASS; |
| return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * evm_xattr_acl_change - check if passed ACL changes the inode mode |
| * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the idmapped mount |
| * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry |
| * @xattr_name: requested xattr |
| * @xattr_value: requested xattr value |
| * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length |
| * |
| * Check if passed ACL changes the inode mode, which is protected by EVM. |
| * |
| * Returns 1 if passed ACL causes inode mode change, 0 otherwise. |
| */ |
| static int evm_xattr_acl_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, |
| struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, |
| const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) |
| { |
| #ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL |
| umode_t mode; |
| struct posix_acl *acl = NULL, *acl_res; |
| struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); |
| int rc; |
| |
| /* |
| * user_ns is not relevant here, ACL_USER/ACL_GROUP don't have impact |
| * on the inode mode (see posix_acl_equiv_mode()). |
| */ |
| acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(&init_user_ns, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); |
| if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acl)) |
| return 1; |
| |
| acl_res = acl; |
| /* |
| * Passing mnt_userns is necessary to correctly determine the GID in |
| * an idmapped mount, as the GID is used to clear the setgid bit in |
| * the inode mode. |
| */ |
| rc = posix_acl_update_mode(mnt_userns, inode, &mode, &acl_res); |
| |
| posix_acl_release(acl); |
| |
| if (rc) |
| return 1; |
| |
| if (inode->i_mode != mode) |
| return 1; |
| #endif |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * evm_xattr_change - check if passed xattr value differs from current value |
| * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the idmapped mount |
| * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry |
| * @xattr_name: requested xattr |
| * @xattr_value: requested xattr value |
| * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length |
| * |
| * Check if passed xattr value differs from current value. |
| * |
| * Returns 1 if passed xattr value differs from current value, 0 otherwise. |
| */ |
| static int evm_xattr_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, |
| struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, |
| const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) |
| { |
| char *xattr_data = NULL; |
| int rc = 0; |
| |
| if (posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name)) |
| return evm_xattr_acl_change(mnt_userns, dentry, xattr_name, |
| xattr_value, xattr_value_len); |
| |
| rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, dentry, xattr_name, &xattr_data, |
| 0, GFP_NOFS); |
| if (rc < 0) |
| return 1; |
| |
| if (rc == xattr_value_len) |
| rc = !!memcmp(xattr_value, xattr_data, rc); |
| else |
| rc = 1; |
| |
| kfree(xattr_data); |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * evm_protect_xattr - protect the EVM extended attribute |
| * |
| * Prevent security.evm from being modified or removed without the |
| * necessary permissions or when the existing value is invalid. |
| * |
| * The posix xattr acls are 'system' prefixed, which normally would not |
| * affect security.evm. An interesting side affect of writing posix xattr |
| * acls is their modifying of the i_mode, which is included in security.evm. |
| * For posix xattr acls only, permit security.evm, even if it currently |
| * doesn't exist, to be updated unless the EVM signature is immutable. |
| */ |
| static int evm_protect_xattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, |
| struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, |
| const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) |
| { |
| enum integrity_status evm_status; |
| |
| if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) { |
| if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
| return -EPERM; |
| } else if (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) { |
| if (!posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name)) |
| return 0; |
| evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); |
| if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) || |
| (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS)) |
| return 0; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); |
| if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) { |
| struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; |
| |
| /* Exception if the HMAC is not going to be calculated. */ |
| if (evm_hmac_disabled()) |
| return 0; |
| |
| iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry)); |
| if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* exception for pseudo filesystems */ |
| if (dentry->d_sb->s_magic == TMPFS_MAGIC |
| || dentry->d_sb->s_magic == SYSFS_MAGIC) |
| return 0; |
| |
| integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, |
| dentry->d_inode, dentry->d_name.name, |
| "update_metadata", |
| integrity_status_msg[evm_status], |
| -EPERM, 0); |
| } |
| out: |
| /* Exception if the HMAC is not going to be calculated. */ |
| if (evm_hmac_disabled() && (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL || |
| evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * Writing other xattrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable |
| * signatures are immutable and can never be updated. |
| */ |
| if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE && |
| !evm_xattr_change(mnt_userns, dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, |
| xattr_value_len)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS && |
| evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) |
| integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry), |
| dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata", |
| integrity_status_msg[evm_status], |
| -EPERM, 0); |
| return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * evm_inode_setxattr - protect the EVM extended attribute |
| * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the idmapped mount |
| * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry |
| * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name |
| * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value |
| * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length |
| * |
| * Before allowing the 'security.evm' protected xattr to be updated, |
| * verify the existing value is valid. As only the kernel should have |
| * access to the EVM encrypted key needed to calculate the HMAC, prevent |
| * userspace from writing HMAC value. Writing 'security.evm' requires |
| * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges. |
| */ |
| int evm_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, |
| const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, |
| size_t xattr_value_len) |
| { |
| const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value; |
| |
| /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though |
| * there's no HMAC key loaded |
| */ |
| if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) { |
| if (!xattr_value_len) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG && |
| xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) |
| return -EPERM; |
| } |
| return evm_protect_xattr(mnt_userns, dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, |
| xattr_value_len); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * evm_inode_removexattr - protect the EVM extended attribute |
| * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the idmapped mount |
| * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry |
| * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name |
| * |
| * Removing 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that |
| * the current value is valid. |
| */ |
| int evm_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, |
| struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) |
| { |
| /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though |
| * there's no HMAC key loaded |
| */ |
| if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return evm_protect_xattr(mnt_userns, dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); |
| } |
| |
| static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode) |
| { |
| struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; |
| |
| iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); |
| if (iint) |
| iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * evm_revalidate_status - report whether EVM status re-validation is necessary |
| * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name |
| * |
| * Report whether callers of evm_verifyxattr() should re-validate the |
| * EVM status. |
| * |
| * Return true if re-validation is necessary, false otherwise. |
| */ |
| bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name) |
| { |
| if (!evm_key_loaded()) |
| return false; |
| |
| /* evm_inode_post_setattr() passes NULL */ |
| if (!xattr_name) |
| return true; |
| |
| if (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name) && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name) && |
| strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM)) |
| return false; |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * evm_inode_post_setxattr - update 'security.evm' to reflect the changes |
| * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry |
| * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name |
| * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value |
| * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length |
| * |
| * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect the change. |
| * |
| * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from |
| * __vfs_setxattr_noperm(). The caller of which has taken the inode's |
| * i_mutex lock. |
| */ |
| void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, |
| const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) |
| { |
| if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) |
| return; |
| |
| evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); |
| |
| if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM)) |
| return; |
| |
| if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) |
| return; |
| |
| evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * evm_inode_post_removexattr - update 'security.evm' after removing the xattr |
| * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry |
| * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name |
| * |
| * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect removal of the xattr. |
| * |
| * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from |
| * vfs_removexattr() which takes the i_mutex. |
| */ |
| void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) |
| { |
| if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) |
| return; |
| |
| evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); |
| |
| if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM)) |
| return; |
| |
| if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) |
| return; |
| |
| evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); |
| } |
| |
| static int evm_attr_change(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) |
| { |
| struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); |
| unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid; |
| |
| if ((!(ia_valid & ATTR_UID) || uid_eq(attr->ia_uid, inode->i_uid)) && |
| (!(ia_valid & ATTR_GID) || gid_eq(attr->ia_gid, inode->i_gid)) && |
| (!(ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) || attr->ia_mode == inode->i_mode)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * evm_inode_setattr - prevent updating an invalid EVM extended attribute |
| * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry |
| * |
| * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature, |
| * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature. |
| */ |
| int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) |
| { |
| unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid; |
| enum integrity_status evm_status; |
| |
| /* Policy permits modification of the protected attrs even though |
| * there's no HMAC key loaded |
| */ |
| if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))) |
| return 0; |
| evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); |
| /* |
| * Writing attrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable signatures |
| * are immutable and can never be updated. |
| */ |
| if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) || |
| (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) || |
| (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE) || |
| (evm_hmac_disabled() && (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL || |
| evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN))) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE && |
| !evm_attr_change(dentry, attr)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry), |
| dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata", |
| integrity_status_msg[evm_status], -EPERM, 0); |
| return -EPERM; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * evm_inode_post_setattr - update 'security.evm' after modifying metadata |
| * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry |
| * @ia_valid: for the UID and GID status |
| * |
| * For now, update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect UID/GID |
| * changes. |
| * |
| * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller |
| * to lock the inode's i_mutex. |
| */ |
| void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) |
| { |
| if (!evm_revalidate_status(NULL)) |
| return; |
| |
| evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); |
| |
| if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) |
| return; |
| |
| if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)) |
| evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm HMAC value |
| */ |
| int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, |
| const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, |
| struct xattr *evm_xattr) |
| { |
| struct evm_xattr *xattr_data; |
| int rc; |
| |
| if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) || |
| !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS); |
| if (!xattr_data) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| xattr_data->data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; |
| rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest); |
| if (rc < 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| evm_xattr->value = xattr_data; |
| evm_xattr->value_len = sizeof(*xattr_data); |
| evm_xattr->name = XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX; |
| return 0; |
| out: |
| kfree(xattr_data); |
| return rc; |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_inode_init_security); |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509 |
| void __init evm_load_x509(void) |
| { |
| int rc; |
| |
| rc = integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH); |
| if (!rc) |
| evm_initialized |= EVM_INIT_X509; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| static int __init init_evm(void) |
| { |
| int error; |
| struct list_head *pos, *q; |
| |
| evm_init_config(); |
| |
| error = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM); |
| if (error) |
| goto error; |
| |
| error = evm_init_secfs(); |
| if (error < 0) { |
| pr_info("Error registering secfs\n"); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| error: |
| if (error != 0) { |
| if (!list_empty(&evm_config_xattrnames)) { |
| list_for_each_safe(pos, q, &evm_config_xattrnames) |
| list_del(pos); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| late_initcall(init_evm); |