|  | .. _perf_security: | 
|  |  | 
|  | Perf Events and tool security | 
|  | ============================= | 
|  |  | 
|  | Overview | 
|  | -------- | 
|  |  | 
|  | Usage of Performance Counters for Linux (perf_events) [1]_ , [2]_ , [3]_ | 
|  | can impose a considerable risk of leaking sensitive data accessed by | 
|  | monitored processes. The data leakage is possible both in scenarios of | 
|  | direct usage of perf_events system call API [2]_ and over data files | 
|  | generated by Perf tool user mode utility (Perf) [3]_ , [4]_ . The risk | 
|  | depends on the nature of data that perf_events performance monitoring | 
|  | units (PMU) [2]_ and Perf collect and expose for performance analysis. | 
|  | Collected system and performance data may be split into several | 
|  | categories: | 
|  |  | 
|  | 1. System hardware and software configuration data, for example: a CPU | 
|  | model and its cache configuration, an amount of available memory and | 
|  | its topology, used kernel and Perf versions, performance monitoring | 
|  | setup including experiment time, events configuration, Perf command | 
|  | line parameters, etc. | 
|  |  | 
|  | 2. User and kernel module paths and their load addresses with sizes, | 
|  | process and thread names with their PIDs and TIDs, timestamps for | 
|  | captured hardware and software events. | 
|  |  | 
|  | 3. Content of kernel software counters (e.g., for context switches, page | 
|  | faults, CPU migrations), architectural hardware performance counters | 
|  | (PMC) [8]_ and machine specific registers (MSR) [9]_ that provide | 
|  | execution metrics for various monitored parts of the system (e.g., | 
|  | memory controller (IMC), interconnect (QPI/UPI) or peripheral (PCIe) | 
|  | uncore counters) without direct attribution to any execution context | 
|  | state. | 
|  |  | 
|  | 4. Content of architectural execution context registers (e.g., RIP, RSP, | 
|  | RBP on x86_64), process user and kernel space memory addresses and | 
|  | data, content of various architectural MSRs that capture data from | 
|  | this category. | 
|  |  | 
|  | Data that belong to the fourth category can potentially contain | 
|  | sensitive process data. If PMUs in some monitoring modes capture values | 
|  | of execution context registers or data from process memory then access | 
|  | to such monitoring capabilities requires to be ordered and secured | 
|  | properly. So, perf_events/Perf performance monitoring is the subject for | 
|  | security access control management [5]_ . | 
|  |  | 
|  | perf_events/Perf access control | 
|  | ------------------------------- | 
|  |  | 
|  | To perform security checks, the Linux implementation splits processes | 
|  | into two categories [6]_ : a) privileged processes (whose effective user | 
|  | ID is 0, referred to as superuser or root), and b) unprivileged | 
|  | processes (whose effective UID is nonzero). Privileged processes bypass | 
|  | all kernel security permission checks so perf_events performance | 
|  | monitoring is fully available to privileged processes without access, | 
|  | scope and resource restrictions. | 
|  |  | 
|  | Unprivileged processes are subject to a full security permission check | 
|  | based on the process's credentials [5]_ (usually: effective UID, | 
|  | effective GID, and supplementary group list). | 
|  |  | 
|  | Linux divides the privileges traditionally associated with superuser | 
|  | into distinct units, known as capabilities [6]_ , which can be | 
|  | independently enabled and disabled on per-thread basis for processes and | 
|  | files of unprivileged users. | 
|  |  | 
|  | Unprivileged processes with enabled CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability are treated | 
|  | as privileged processes with respect to perf_events performance | 
|  | monitoring and bypass *scope* permissions checks in the kernel. | 
|  |  | 
|  | Unprivileged processes using perf_events system call API is also subject | 
|  | for PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS ptrace access mode check [7]_ , whose | 
|  | outcome determines whether monitoring is permitted. So unprivileged | 
|  | processes provided with CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability are effectively | 
|  | permitted to pass the check. | 
|  |  | 
|  | Other capabilities being granted to unprivileged processes can | 
|  | effectively enable capturing of additional data required for later | 
|  | performance analysis of monitored processes or a system. For example, | 
|  | CAP_SYSLOG capability permits reading kernel space memory addresses from | 
|  | /proc/kallsyms file. | 
|  |  | 
|  | perf_events/Perf privileged users | 
|  | --------------------------------- | 
|  |  | 
|  | Mechanisms of capabilities, privileged capability-dumb files [6]_ and | 
|  | file system ACLs [10]_ can be used to create a dedicated group of | 
|  | perf_events/Perf privileged users who are permitted to execute | 
|  | performance monitoring without scope limits. The following steps can be | 
|  | taken to create such a group of privileged Perf users. | 
|  |  | 
|  | 1. Create perf_users group of privileged Perf users, assign perf_users | 
|  | group to Perf tool executable and limit access to the executable for | 
|  | other users in the system who are not in the perf_users group: | 
|  |  | 
|  | :: | 
|  |  | 
|  | # groupadd perf_users | 
|  | # ls -alhF | 
|  | -rwxr-xr-x  2 root root  11M Oct 19 15:12 perf | 
|  | # chgrp perf_users perf | 
|  | # ls -alhF | 
|  | -rwxr-xr-x  2 root perf_users  11M Oct 19 15:12 perf | 
|  | # chmod o-rwx perf | 
|  | # ls -alhF | 
|  | -rwxr-x---  2 root perf_users  11M Oct 19 15:12 perf | 
|  |  | 
|  | 2. Assign the required capabilities to the Perf tool executable file and | 
|  | enable members of perf_users group with performance monitoring | 
|  | privileges [6]_ : | 
|  |  | 
|  | :: | 
|  |  | 
|  | # setcap "cap_sys_admin,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf | 
|  | # setcap -v "cap_sys_admin,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf | 
|  | perf: OK | 
|  | # getcap perf | 
|  | perf = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_sys_admin,cap_syslog+ep | 
|  |  | 
|  | As a result, members of perf_users group are capable of conducting | 
|  | performance monitoring by using functionality of the configured Perf | 
|  | tool executable that, when executes, passes perf_events subsystem scope | 
|  | checks. | 
|  |  | 
|  | This specific access control management is only available to superuser | 
|  | or root running processes with CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_SETFCAP [6]_ | 
|  | capabilities. | 
|  |  | 
|  | perf_events/Perf unprivileged users | 
|  | ----------------------------------- | 
|  |  | 
|  | perf_events/Perf *scope* and *access* control for unprivileged processes | 
|  | is governed by perf_event_paranoid [2]_ setting: | 
|  |  | 
|  | -1: | 
|  | Impose no *scope* and *access* restrictions on using perf_events | 
|  | performance monitoring. Per-user per-cpu perf_event_mlock_kb [2]_ | 
|  | locking limit is ignored when allocating memory buffers for storing | 
|  | performance data. This is the least secure mode since allowed | 
|  | monitored *scope* is maximized and no perf_events specific limits | 
|  | are imposed on *resources* allocated for performance monitoring. | 
|  |  | 
|  | >=0: | 
|  | *scope* includes per-process and system wide performance monitoring | 
|  | but excludes raw tracepoints and ftrace function tracepoints | 
|  | monitoring. CPU and system events happened when executing either in | 
|  | user or in kernel space can be monitored and captured for later | 
|  | analysis. Per-user per-cpu perf_event_mlock_kb locking limit is | 
|  | imposed but ignored for unprivileged processes with CAP_IPC_LOCK | 
|  | [6]_ capability. | 
|  |  | 
|  | >=1: | 
|  | *scope* includes per-process performance monitoring only and | 
|  | excludes system wide performance monitoring. CPU and system events | 
|  | happened when executing either in user or in kernel space can be | 
|  | monitored and captured for later analysis. Per-user per-cpu | 
|  | perf_event_mlock_kb locking limit is imposed but ignored for | 
|  | unprivileged processes with CAP_IPC_LOCK capability. | 
|  |  | 
|  | >=2: | 
|  | *scope* includes per-process performance monitoring only. CPU and | 
|  | system events happened when executing in user space only can be | 
|  | monitored and captured for later analysis. Per-user per-cpu | 
|  | perf_event_mlock_kb locking limit is imposed but ignored for | 
|  | unprivileged processes with CAP_IPC_LOCK capability. | 
|  |  | 
|  | perf_events/Perf resource control | 
|  | --------------------------------- | 
|  |  | 
|  | Open file descriptors | 
|  | +++++++++++++++++++++ | 
|  |  | 
|  | The perf_events system call API [2]_ allocates file descriptors for | 
|  | every configured PMU event. Open file descriptors are a per-process | 
|  | accountable resource governed by the RLIMIT_NOFILE [11]_ limit | 
|  | (ulimit -n), which is usually derived from the login shell process. When | 
|  | configuring Perf collection for a long list of events on a large server | 
|  | system, this limit can be easily hit preventing required monitoring | 
|  | configuration. RLIMIT_NOFILE limit can be increased on per-user basis | 
|  | modifying content of the limits.conf file [12]_ . Ordinarily, a Perf | 
|  | sampling session (perf record) requires an amount of open perf_event | 
|  | file descriptors that is not less than the number of monitored events | 
|  | multiplied by the number of monitored CPUs. | 
|  |  | 
|  | Memory allocation | 
|  | +++++++++++++++++ | 
|  |  | 
|  | The amount of memory available to user processes for capturing | 
|  | performance monitoring data is governed by the perf_event_mlock_kb [2]_ | 
|  | setting. This perf_event specific resource setting defines overall | 
|  | per-cpu limits of memory allowed for mapping by the user processes to | 
|  | execute performance monitoring. The setting essentially extends the | 
|  | RLIMIT_MEMLOCK [11]_ limit, but only for memory regions mapped | 
|  | specifically for capturing monitored performance events and related data. | 
|  |  | 
|  | For example, if a machine has eight cores and perf_event_mlock_kb limit | 
|  | is set to 516 KiB, then a user process is provided with 516 KiB * 8 = | 
|  | 4128 KiB of memory above the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK limit (ulimit -l) for | 
|  | perf_event mmap buffers. In particular, this means that, if the user | 
|  | wants to start two or more performance monitoring processes, the user is | 
|  | required to manually distribute the available 4128 KiB between the | 
|  | monitoring processes, for example, using the --mmap-pages Perf record | 
|  | mode option. Otherwise, the first started performance monitoring process | 
|  | allocates all available 4128 KiB and the other processes will fail to | 
|  | proceed due to the lack of memory. | 
|  |  | 
|  | RLIMIT_MEMLOCK and perf_event_mlock_kb resource constraints are ignored | 
|  | for processes with the CAP_IPC_LOCK capability. Thus, perf_events/Perf | 
|  | privileged users can be provided with memory above the constraints for | 
|  | perf_events/Perf performance monitoring purpose by providing the Perf | 
|  | executable with CAP_IPC_LOCK capability. | 
|  |  | 
|  | Bibliography | 
|  | ------------ | 
|  |  | 
|  | .. [1] `<https://lwn.net/Articles/337493/>`_ | 
|  | .. [2] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/perf_event_open.2.html>`_ | 
|  | .. [3] `<http://web.eece.maine.edu/~vweaver/projects/perf_events/>`_ | 
|  | .. [4] `<https://perf.wiki.kernel.org/index.php/Main_Page>`_ | 
|  | .. [5] `<https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/security/credentials.html>`_ | 
|  | .. [6] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html>`_ | 
|  | .. [7] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ptrace.2.html>`_ | 
|  | .. [8] `<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_performance_counter>`_ | 
|  | .. [9] `<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model-specific_register>`_ | 
|  | .. [10] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/acl.5.html>`_ | 
|  | .. [11] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/getrlimit.2.html>`_ | 
|  | .. [12] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/limits.conf.5.html>`_ | 
|  |  |