| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 |
| /* |
| * File contents en/decryption on block-based filesystems |
| * |
| * Copyright 2019 Google LLC |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * This file implements fscrypt's file contents en/decryption using blk-crypto |
| * (Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst). fscrypt assigns a bio_crypt_ctx |
| * with a key and IV to each bio, and the block layer does the en/decryption. |
| * |
| * This file's exported functions are called only by block-based filesystems. |
| */ |
| |
| #include <linux/blk-crypto.h> |
| #include <linux/blkdev.h> |
| #include <linux/export.h> |
| #include <linux/sched/mm.h> |
| #include <linux/slab.h> |
| #include <linux/uio.h> |
| |
| #include "fscrypt_private.h" |
| |
| static unsigned int |
| fscrypt_get_devices(struct super_block *sb, |
| struct block_device *devs[FSCRYPT_MAX_DEVICES]) |
| { |
| if (sb->s_cop->get_devices) |
| return sb->s_cop->get_devices(sb, devs); |
| devs[0] = sb->s_bdev; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static unsigned int fscrypt_get_dun_bytes(const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci) |
| { |
| const struct super_block *sb = ci->ci_inode->i_sb; |
| unsigned int flags = fscrypt_policy_flags(&ci->ci_policy); |
| int dun_bits; |
| |
| if (flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY) |
| return offsetofend(union fscrypt_iv, nonce); |
| |
| if (flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64) |
| return sizeof(__le64); |
| |
| if (flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32) |
| return sizeof(__le32); |
| |
| /* Default case: IVs are just the file data unit index */ |
| dun_bits = fscrypt_max_file_dun_bits(sb, ci->ci_data_unit_bits); |
| return DIV_ROUND_UP(dun_bits, 8); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Log a message when starting to use blk-crypto (native) or blk-crypto-fallback |
| * for an encryption mode for the first time. This is the blk-crypto |
| * counterpart to the message logged when starting to use the crypto API for the |
| * first time. A limitation is that these messages don't convey which specific |
| * filesystems or files are using each implementation. However, *usually* |
| * systems use just one implementation per mode, which makes these messages |
| * helpful for debugging problems where the "wrong" implementation is used. |
| */ |
| static void fscrypt_log_blk_crypto_impl(struct fscrypt_mode *mode, |
| struct block_device *dev, |
| const struct blk_crypto_key *blk_key) |
| { |
| if (blk_crypto_config_supported_natively(dev, &blk_key->crypto_cfg)) { |
| if (!xchg(&mode->logged_blk_crypto_native, 1)) |
| pr_info("fscrypt: %s using blk-crypto (native)\n", |
| mode->friendly_name); |
| } else if (!xchg(&mode->logged_blk_crypto_fallback, 1)) { |
| pr_info("fscrypt: %s using blk-crypto-fallback\n", |
| mode->friendly_name); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| int fscrypt_prepare_inline_crypt_key(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key, |
| const u8 *key_bytes, size_t key_size, |
| bool is_hw_wrapped, |
| const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci) |
| { |
| const struct inode *inode = ci->ci_inode; |
| struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb; |
| bool inlinecrypt = sb->s_flags & SB_INLINECRYPT; |
| struct fscrypt_mode *mode = ci->ci_mode; |
| enum blk_crypto_key_type key_type = is_hw_wrapped ? |
| BLK_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_HW_WRAPPED : BLK_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_RAW; |
| struct blk_crypto_key *blk_key; |
| struct block_device *devs[FSCRYPT_MAX_DEVICES]; |
| unsigned int num_devs; |
| unsigned int i; |
| int err; |
| |
| if (is_hw_wrapped && !inlinecrypt) { |
| /* |
| * blk_crypto_init_key() would catch this anyway, but this |
| * provides a clearer error message. |
| */ |
| fscrypt_err( |
| inode, |
| "Hardware-wrapped keys require inline encryption (-o inlinecrypt)"); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| blk_key = kmalloc_obj(*blk_key); |
| if (!blk_key) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| err = blk_crypto_init_key(blk_key, key_bytes, key_size, key_type, |
| mode->blk_crypto_mode, |
| fscrypt_get_dun_bytes(ci), |
| 1U << ci->ci_data_unit_bits, |
| inlinecrypt ? BLK_CRYPTO_CFG_ALLOW_HW : 0); |
| if (err) { |
| fscrypt_err(inode, "Error %d initializing blk-crypto key", err); |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| /* Start using blk-crypto on all the filesystem's block devices. */ |
| num_devs = fscrypt_get_devices(sb, devs); |
| for (i = 0; i < num_devs; i++) { |
| err = blk_crypto_start_using_key(devs[i], blk_key); |
| if (err) |
| break; |
| fscrypt_log_blk_crypto_impl(mode, devs[i], blk_key); |
| } |
| if (err) { |
| if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP && is_hw_wrapped) |
| fscrypt_err( |
| inode, |
| "Hardware-wrapped key required, but no suitable inline encryption capabilities are available"); |
| else |
| fscrypt_err(inode, |
| "Error %d starting to use blk-crypto", err); |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| prep_key->blk_key = blk_key; |
| return 0; |
| |
| fail: |
| kfree_sensitive(blk_key); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| void fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key(struct super_block *sb, |
| struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key) |
| { |
| struct blk_crypto_key *blk_key = prep_key->blk_key; |
| struct block_device *devs[FSCRYPT_MAX_DEVICES]; |
| unsigned int num_devs; |
| unsigned int i; |
| |
| if (!blk_key) |
| return; |
| |
| /* |
| * Evict the key from all the filesystem's block devices. |
| * This *must* be done before the key is freed. |
| */ |
| num_devs = fscrypt_get_devices(sb, devs); |
| for (i = 0; i < num_devs; i++) |
| blk_crypto_evict_key(devs[i], blk_key); |
| |
| kfree_sensitive(blk_key); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Ask the inline encryption hardware to derive the software secret from a |
| * hardware-wrapped key. Returns -EOPNOTSUPP if hardware-wrapped keys aren't |
| * supported on this filesystem or hardware. |
| */ |
| int fscrypt_derive_sw_secret(struct super_block *sb, |
| const u8 *wrapped_key, size_t wrapped_key_size, |
| u8 sw_secret[BLK_CRYPTO_SW_SECRET_SIZE]) |
| { |
| int err; |
| |
| /* The filesystem must be mounted with -o inlinecrypt. */ |
| if (!(sb->s_flags & SB_INLINECRYPT)) { |
| fscrypt_warn(NULL, |
| "%s: filesystem not mounted with inlinecrypt\n", |
| sb->s_id); |
| return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
| } |
| |
| err = blk_crypto_derive_sw_secret(sb->s_bdev, wrapped_key, |
| wrapped_key_size, sw_secret); |
| if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP) |
| fscrypt_warn(NULL, |
| "%s: block device doesn't support hardware-wrapped keys\n", |
| sb->s_id); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| static void fscrypt_generate_dun(const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci, |
| loff_t pos, u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE]) |
| { |
| union fscrypt_iv iv; |
| int i; |
| |
| fscrypt_generate_iv(&iv, pos >> ci->ci_data_unit_bits, ci); |
| |
| BUILD_BUG_ON(FSCRYPT_MAX_IV_SIZE > BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE); |
| memset(dun, 0, BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE); |
| for (i = 0; i < ci->ci_mode->ivsize/sizeof(dun[0]); i++) |
| dun[i] = le64_to_cpu(iv.dun[i]); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx() - prepare a file contents bio for inline crypto |
| * @bio: a bio which will eventually be submitted to the file |
| * @inode: the file's inode |
| * @pos: the first file position (in bytes) in the I/O |
| * @gfp_mask: memory allocation flags - these must be a waiting mask so that |
| * bio_crypt_set_ctx can't fail. |
| * |
| * If the contents of the file should be encrypted (or decrypted), then assign |
| * the appropriate encryption context to the bio. |
| * |
| * Normally the bio should be newly allocated (i.e. no pages added yet), as |
| * otherwise fscrypt_mergeable_bio() won't work as intended. |
| * |
| * The encryption context will be freed automatically when the bio is freed. |
| */ |
| void fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx(struct bio *bio, const struct inode *inode, |
| loff_t pos, gfp_t gfp_mask) |
| { |
| const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci; |
| u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE]; |
| |
| if (!fscrypt_needs_contents_encryption(inode)) |
| return; |
| ci = fscrypt_get_inode_info_raw(inode); |
| |
| fscrypt_generate_dun(ci, pos, dun); |
| bio_crypt_set_ctx(bio, ci->ci_enc_key.blk_key, dun, gfp_mask); |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx); |
| |
| /** |
| * fscrypt_mergeable_bio() - test whether data can be added to a bio |
| * @bio: the bio being built up |
| * @inode: the inode for the next part of the I/O |
| * @pos: the next file position (in bytes) in the I/O |
| * |
| * When building a bio which may contain data which should undergo encryption |
| * (or decryption) via fscrypt, filesystems should call this function to ensure |
| * that the resulting bio contains only contiguous data unit numbers. This will |
| * return false if the next part of the I/O cannot be merged with the bio |
| * because either the encryption key would be different or the encryption data |
| * unit numbers would be discontiguous. |
| * |
| * fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx() must have already been called on the bio. |
| * |
| * This function isn't required in cases where crypto-mergeability is ensured in |
| * another way, such as I/O targeting only a single file (and thus a single key) |
| * combined with fscrypt_limit_io_blocks() to ensure DUN contiguity. |
| * |
| * Return: true iff the I/O is mergeable |
| */ |
| bool fscrypt_mergeable_bio(struct bio *bio, const struct inode *inode, |
| loff_t pos) |
| { |
| const struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = bio->bi_crypt_context; |
| const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci; |
| u64 next_dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE]; |
| |
| if (!!bc != fscrypt_needs_contents_encryption(inode)) |
| return false; |
| if (!bc) |
| return true; |
| ci = fscrypt_get_inode_info_raw(inode); |
| |
| /* |
| * Comparing the key pointers is good enough, as all I/O for each key |
| * uses the same pointer. I.e., there's currently no need to support |
| * merging requests where the keys are the same but the pointers differ. |
| */ |
| if (bc->bc_key != ci->ci_enc_key.blk_key) |
| return false; |
| |
| fscrypt_generate_dun(ci, pos, next_dun); |
| return bio_crypt_dun_is_contiguous(bc, bio->bi_iter.bi_size, next_dun); |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_mergeable_bio); |
| |
| /** |
| * fscrypt_limit_io_blocks() - limit I/O blocks to avoid discontiguous DUNs |
| * @inode: the file on which I/O is being done |
| * @lblk: the block at which the I/O is being started from |
| * @nr_blocks: the number of blocks we want to submit starting at @lblk |
| * |
| * Determine the limit to the number of blocks that can be submitted in a bio |
| * targeting @lblk without causing a data unit number (DUN) discontiguity. |
| * |
| * This is normally just @nr_blocks, as normally the DUNs just increment along |
| * with the logical blocks. (Or the file is not encrypted.) |
| * |
| * In rare cases, fscrypt can be using an IV generation method that allows the |
| * DUN to wrap around within logically contiguous blocks, and that wraparound |
| * will occur. If this happens, a value less than @nr_blocks will be returned |
| * so that the wraparound doesn't occur in the middle of a bio, which would |
| * cause encryption/decryption to produce wrong results. |
| * |
| * Return: the actual number of blocks that can be submitted |
| */ |
| u64 fscrypt_limit_io_blocks(const struct inode *inode, u64 lblk, u64 nr_blocks) |
| { |
| const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci; |
| u32 dun; |
| |
| if (!fscrypt_needs_contents_encryption(inode)) |
| return nr_blocks; |
| |
| if (nr_blocks <= 1) |
| return nr_blocks; |
| |
| ci = fscrypt_get_inode_info_raw(inode); |
| if (!(fscrypt_policy_flags(&ci->ci_policy) & |
| FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32)) |
| return nr_blocks; |
| |
| /* With IV_INO_LBLK_32, the DUN can wrap around from U32_MAX to 0. */ |
| |
| dun = ci->ci_hashed_ino + lblk; |
| |
| return min_t(u64, nr_blocks, (u64)U32_MAX + 1 - dun); |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_limit_io_blocks); |
| |
| struct fscrypt_zero_done { |
| atomic_t pending; |
| blk_status_t status; |
| struct completion done; |
| }; |
| |
| static void fscrypt_zeroout_range_done(struct fscrypt_zero_done *done) |
| { |
| if (atomic_dec_and_test(&done->pending)) |
| complete(&done->done); |
| } |
| |
| static void fscrypt_zeroout_range_end_io(struct bio *bio) |
| { |
| struct fscrypt_zero_done *done = bio->bi_private; |
| |
| if (bio->bi_status) |
| cmpxchg(&done->status, 0, bio->bi_status); |
| fscrypt_zeroout_range_done(done); |
| bio_put(bio); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * fscrypt_zeroout_range() - zero out a range of blocks in an encrypted file |
| * @inode: the file's inode |
| * @pos: the first file position (in bytes) to zero out |
| * @sector: the first sector to zero out |
| * @len: bytes to zero out |
| * |
| * Zero out filesystem blocks in an encrypted regular file on-disk, i.e. write |
| * ciphertext blocks which decrypt to the all-zeroes block. The blocks must be |
| * both logically and physically contiguous. It's also assumed that the |
| * filesystem only uses a single block device, ->s_bdev. @len must be a |
| * multiple of the file system logical block size. |
| * |
| * Note that since each block uses a different IV, this involves writing a |
| * different ciphertext to each block; we can't simply reuse the same one. |
| * |
| * Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure. |
| */ |
| int fscrypt_zeroout_range(const struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, |
| sector_t sector, u64 len) |
| { |
| struct fscrypt_zero_done done = { |
| .pending = ATOMIC_INIT(1), |
| .done = COMPLETION_INITIALIZER_ONSTACK(done.done), |
| }; |
| |
| if (len == 0) |
| return 0; |
| |
| do { |
| struct bio *bio; |
| unsigned int n; |
| |
| bio = bio_alloc(inode->i_sb->s_bdev, BIO_MAX_VECS, REQ_OP_WRITE, |
| GFP_NOFS); |
| bio->bi_iter.bi_sector = sector; |
| bio->bi_private = &done; |
| bio->bi_end_io = fscrypt_zeroout_range_end_io; |
| fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx(bio, inode, pos, GFP_NOFS); |
| |
| for (n = 0; n < BIO_MAX_VECS; n++) { |
| unsigned int bytes_this_page = min(len, PAGE_SIZE); |
| |
| __bio_add_page(bio, ZERO_PAGE(0), bytes_this_page, 0); |
| len -= bytes_this_page; |
| pos += bytes_this_page; |
| sector += (bytes_this_page >> SECTOR_SHIFT); |
| if (!len || !fscrypt_mergeable_bio(bio, inode, pos)) |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| atomic_inc(&done.pending); |
| blk_crypto_submit_bio(bio); |
| } while (len); |
| |
| fscrypt_zeroout_range_done(&done); |
| |
| wait_for_completion(&done.done); |
| return blk_status_to_errno(done.status); |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_zeroout_range); |