| /* | 
 |  * Non-physical true random number generator based on timing jitter -- | 
 |  * Jitter RNG standalone code. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Copyright Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>, 2015 - 2020 | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Design | 
 |  * ====== | 
 |  * | 
 |  * See https://www.chronox.de/jent.html | 
 |  * | 
 |  * License | 
 |  * ======= | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | 
 |  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | 
 |  * are met: | 
 |  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | 
 |  *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety, | 
 |  *    including the disclaimer of warranties. | 
 |  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | 
 |  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | 
 |  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | 
 |  * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote | 
 |  *    products derived from this software without specific prior | 
 |  *    written permission. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of | 
 |  * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2 are | 
 |  * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is | 
 |  * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and | 
 |  * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.) | 
 |  * | 
 |  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED | 
 |  * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES | 
 |  * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF | 
 |  * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE | 
 |  * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR | 
 |  * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT | 
 |  * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR | 
 |  * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF | 
 |  * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT | 
 |  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE | 
 |  * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH | 
 |  * DAMAGE. | 
 |  */ | 
 |  | 
 | /* | 
 |  * This Jitterentropy RNG is based on the jitterentropy library | 
 |  * version 2.2.0 provided at https://www.chronox.de/jent.html | 
 |  */ | 
 |  | 
 | #ifdef __OPTIMIZE__ | 
 |  #error "The CPU Jitter random number generator must not be compiled with optimizations. See documentation. Use the compiler switch -O0 for compiling jitterentropy.c." | 
 | #endif | 
 |  | 
 | typedef	unsigned long long	__u64; | 
 | typedef	long long		__s64; | 
 | typedef	unsigned int		__u32; | 
 | #define NULL    ((void *) 0) | 
 |  | 
 | /* The entropy pool */ | 
 | struct rand_data { | 
 | 	/* all data values that are vital to maintain the security | 
 | 	 * of the RNG are marked as SENSITIVE. A user must not | 
 | 	 * access that information while the RNG executes its loops to | 
 | 	 * calculate the next random value. */ | 
 | 	__u64 data;		/* SENSITIVE Actual random number */ | 
 | 	__u64 old_data;		/* SENSITIVE Previous random number */ | 
 | 	__u64 prev_time;	/* SENSITIVE Previous time stamp */ | 
 | #define DATA_SIZE_BITS ((sizeof(__u64)) * 8) | 
 | 	__u64 last_delta;	/* SENSITIVE stuck test */ | 
 | 	__s64 last_delta2;	/* SENSITIVE stuck test */ | 
 | 	unsigned int osr;	/* Oversample rate */ | 
 | #define JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS 64 | 
 | #define JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE 32 | 
 | #define JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS 128 | 
 | #define JENT_MEMORY_SIZE (JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS*JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE) | 
 | 	unsigned char *mem;	/* Memory access location with size of | 
 | 				 * memblocks * memblocksize */ | 
 | 	unsigned int memlocation; /* Pointer to byte in *mem */ | 
 | 	unsigned int memblocks;	/* Number of memory blocks in *mem */ | 
 | 	unsigned int memblocksize; /* Size of one memory block in bytes */ | 
 | 	unsigned int memaccessloops; /* Number of memory accesses per random | 
 | 				      * bit generation */ | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* Repetition Count Test */ | 
 | 	int rct_count;			/* Number of stuck values */ | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* Adaptive Proportion Test for a significance level of 2^-30 */ | 
 | #define JENT_APT_CUTOFF		325	/* Taken from SP800-90B sec 4.4.2 */ | 
 | #define JENT_APT_WINDOW_SIZE	512	/* Data window size */ | 
 | 	/* LSB of time stamp to process */ | 
 | #define JENT_APT_LSB		16 | 
 | #define JENT_APT_WORD_MASK	(JENT_APT_LSB - 1) | 
 | 	unsigned int apt_observations;	/* Number of collected observations */ | 
 | 	unsigned int apt_count;		/* APT counter */ | 
 | 	unsigned int apt_base;		/* APT base reference */ | 
 | 	unsigned int apt_base_set:1;	/* APT base reference set? */ | 
 |  | 
 | 	unsigned int health_failure:1;	/* Permanent health failure */ | 
 | }; | 
 |  | 
 | /* Flags that can be used to initialize the RNG */ | 
 | #define JENT_DISABLE_MEMORY_ACCESS (1<<2) /* Disable memory access for more | 
 | 					   * entropy, saves MEMORY_SIZE RAM for | 
 | 					   * entropy collector */ | 
 |  | 
 | /* -- error codes for init function -- */ | 
 | #define JENT_ENOTIME		1 /* Timer service not available */ | 
 | #define JENT_ECOARSETIME	2 /* Timer too coarse for RNG */ | 
 | #define JENT_ENOMONOTONIC	3 /* Timer is not monotonic increasing */ | 
 | #define JENT_EVARVAR		5 /* Timer does not produce variations of | 
 | 				   * variations (2nd derivation of time is | 
 | 				   * zero). */ | 
 | #define JENT_ESTUCK		8 /* Too many stuck results during init. */ | 
 | #define JENT_EHEALTH		9 /* Health test failed during initialization */ | 
 | #define JENT_ERCT		10 /* RCT failed during initialization */ | 
 |  | 
 | /* | 
 |  * The output n bits can receive more than n bits of min entropy, of course, | 
 |  * but the fixed output of the conditioning function can only asymptotically | 
 |  * approach the output size bits of min entropy, not attain that bound. Random | 
 |  * maps will tend to have output collisions, which reduces the creditable | 
 |  * output entropy (that is what SP 800-90B Section 3.1.5.1.2 attempts to bound). | 
 |  * | 
 |  * The value "64" is justified in Appendix A.4 of the current 90C draft, | 
 |  * and aligns with NIST's in "epsilon" definition in this document, which is | 
 |  * that a string can be considered "full entropy" if you can bound the min | 
 |  * entropy in each bit of output to at least 1-epsilon, where epsilon is | 
 |  * required to be <= 2^(-32). | 
 |  */ | 
 | #define JENT_ENTROPY_SAFETY_FACTOR	64 | 
 |  | 
 | #include <linux/fips.h> | 
 | #include "jitterentropy.h" | 
 |  | 
 | /*************************************************************************** | 
 |  * Adaptive Proportion Test | 
 |  * | 
 |  * This test complies with SP800-90B section 4.4.2. | 
 |  ***************************************************************************/ | 
 |  | 
 | /* | 
 |  * Reset the APT counter | 
 |  * | 
 |  * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | 
 |  */ | 
 | static void jent_apt_reset(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned int delta_masked) | 
 | { | 
 | 	/* Reset APT counter */ | 
 | 	ec->apt_count = 0; | 
 | 	ec->apt_base = delta_masked; | 
 | 	ec->apt_observations = 0; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /* | 
 |  * Insert a new entropy event into APT | 
 |  * | 
 |  * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | 
 |  * @delta_masked [in] Masked time delta to process | 
 |  */ | 
 | static void jent_apt_insert(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned int delta_masked) | 
 | { | 
 | 	/* Initialize the base reference */ | 
 | 	if (!ec->apt_base_set) { | 
 | 		ec->apt_base = delta_masked; | 
 | 		ec->apt_base_set = 1; | 
 | 		return; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (delta_masked == ec->apt_base) { | 
 | 		ec->apt_count++; | 
 |  | 
 | 		if (ec->apt_count >= JENT_APT_CUTOFF) | 
 | 			ec->health_failure = 1; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	ec->apt_observations++; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (ec->apt_observations >= JENT_APT_WINDOW_SIZE) | 
 | 		jent_apt_reset(ec, delta_masked); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /*************************************************************************** | 
 |  * Stuck Test and its use as Repetition Count Test | 
 |  * | 
 |  * The Jitter RNG uses an enhanced version of the Repetition Count Test | 
 |  * (RCT) specified in SP800-90B section 4.4.1. Instead of counting identical | 
 |  * back-to-back values, the input to the RCT is the counting of the stuck | 
 |  * values during the generation of one Jitter RNG output block. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * The RCT is applied with an alpha of 2^{-30} compliant to FIPS 140-2 IG 9.8. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * During the counting operation, the Jitter RNG always calculates the RCT | 
 |  * cut-off value of C. If that value exceeds the allowed cut-off value, | 
 |  * the Jitter RNG output block will be calculated completely but discarded at | 
 |  * the end. The caller of the Jitter RNG is informed with an error code. | 
 |  ***************************************************************************/ | 
 |  | 
 | /* | 
 |  * Repetition Count Test as defined in SP800-90B section 4.4.1 | 
 |  * | 
 |  * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | 
 |  * @stuck [in] Indicator whether the value is stuck | 
 |  */ | 
 | static void jent_rct_insert(struct rand_data *ec, int stuck) | 
 | { | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * If we have a count less than zero, a previous RCT round identified | 
 | 	 * a failure. We will not overwrite it. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	if (ec->rct_count < 0) | 
 | 		return; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (stuck) { | 
 | 		ec->rct_count++; | 
 |  | 
 | 		/* | 
 | 		 * The cutoff value is based on the following consideration: | 
 | 		 * alpha = 2^-30 as recommended in FIPS 140-2 IG 9.8. | 
 | 		 * In addition, we require an entropy value H of 1/OSR as this | 
 | 		 * is the minimum entropy required to provide full entropy. | 
 | 		 * Note, we collect 64 * OSR deltas for inserting them into | 
 | 		 * the entropy pool which should then have (close to) 64 bits | 
 | 		 * of entropy. | 
 | 		 * | 
 | 		 * Note, ec->rct_count (which equals to value B in the pseudo | 
 | 		 * code of SP800-90B section 4.4.1) starts with zero. Hence | 
 | 		 * we need to subtract one from the cutoff value as calculated | 
 | 		 * following SP800-90B. | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		if ((unsigned int)ec->rct_count >= (31 * ec->osr)) { | 
 | 			ec->rct_count = -1; | 
 | 			ec->health_failure = 1; | 
 | 		} | 
 | 	} else { | 
 | 		ec->rct_count = 0; | 
 | 	} | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /* | 
 |  * Is there an RCT health test failure? | 
 |  * | 
 |  * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | 
 |  * | 
 |  * @return | 
 |  * 	0 No health test failure | 
 |  * 	1 Permanent health test failure | 
 |  */ | 
 | static int jent_rct_failure(struct rand_data *ec) | 
 | { | 
 | 	if (ec->rct_count < 0) | 
 | 		return 1; | 
 | 	return 0; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static inline __u64 jent_delta(__u64 prev, __u64 next) | 
 | { | 
 | #define JENT_UINT64_MAX		(__u64)(~((__u64) 0)) | 
 | 	return (prev < next) ? (next - prev) : | 
 | 			       (JENT_UINT64_MAX - prev + 1 + next); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /* | 
 |  * Stuck test by checking the: | 
 |  * 	1st derivative of the jitter measurement (time delta) | 
 |  * 	2nd derivative of the jitter measurement (delta of time deltas) | 
 |  * 	3rd derivative of the jitter measurement (delta of delta of time deltas) | 
 |  * | 
 |  * All values must always be non-zero. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | 
 |  * @current_delta [in] Jitter time delta | 
 |  * | 
 |  * @return | 
 |  * 	0 jitter measurement not stuck (good bit) | 
 |  * 	1 jitter measurement stuck (reject bit) | 
 |  */ | 
 | static int jent_stuck(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 current_delta) | 
 | { | 
 | 	__u64 delta2 = jent_delta(ec->last_delta, current_delta); | 
 | 	__u64 delta3 = jent_delta(ec->last_delta2, delta2); | 
 |  | 
 | 	ec->last_delta = current_delta; | 
 | 	ec->last_delta2 = delta2; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * Insert the result of the comparison of two back-to-back time | 
 | 	 * deltas. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	jent_apt_insert(ec, current_delta); | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (!current_delta || !delta2 || !delta3) { | 
 | 		/* RCT with a stuck bit */ | 
 | 		jent_rct_insert(ec, 1); | 
 | 		return 1; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* RCT with a non-stuck bit */ | 
 | 	jent_rct_insert(ec, 0); | 
 |  | 
 | 	return 0; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /* | 
 |  * Report any health test failures | 
 |  * | 
 |  * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | 
 |  * | 
 |  * @return | 
 |  * 	0 No health test failure | 
 |  * 	1 Permanent health test failure | 
 |  */ | 
 | static int jent_health_failure(struct rand_data *ec) | 
 | { | 
 | 	return ec->health_failure; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /*************************************************************************** | 
 |  * Noise sources | 
 |  ***************************************************************************/ | 
 |  | 
 | /* | 
 |  * Update of the loop count used for the next round of | 
 |  * an entropy collection. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Input: | 
 |  * @ec entropy collector struct -- may be NULL | 
 |  * @bits is the number of low bits of the timer to consider | 
 |  * @min is the number of bits we shift the timer value to the right at | 
 |  *	the end to make sure we have a guaranteed minimum value | 
 |  * | 
 |  * @return Newly calculated loop counter | 
 |  */ | 
 | static __u64 jent_loop_shuffle(struct rand_data *ec, | 
 | 			       unsigned int bits, unsigned int min) | 
 | { | 
 | 	__u64 time = 0; | 
 | 	__u64 shuffle = 0; | 
 | 	unsigned int i = 0; | 
 | 	unsigned int mask = (1<<bits) - 1; | 
 |  | 
 | 	jent_get_nstime(&time); | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * Mix the current state of the random number into the shuffle | 
 | 	 * calculation to balance that shuffle a bit more. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	if (ec) | 
 | 		time ^= ec->data; | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * We fold the time value as much as possible to ensure that as many | 
 | 	 * bits of the time stamp are included as possible. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	for (i = 0; ((DATA_SIZE_BITS + bits - 1) / bits) > i; i++) { | 
 | 		shuffle ^= time & mask; | 
 | 		time = time >> bits; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * We add a lower boundary value to ensure we have a minimum | 
 | 	 * RNG loop count. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	return (shuffle + (1<<min)); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /* | 
 |  * CPU Jitter noise source -- this is the noise source based on the CPU | 
 |  *			      execution time jitter | 
 |  * | 
 |  * This function injects the individual bits of the time value into the | 
 |  * entropy pool using an LFSR. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * The code is deliberately inefficient with respect to the bit shifting | 
 |  * and shall stay that way. This function is the root cause why the code | 
 |  * shall be compiled without optimization. This function not only acts as | 
 |  * folding operation, but this function's execution is used to measure | 
 |  * the CPU execution time jitter. Any change to the loop in this function | 
 |  * implies that careful retesting must be done. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * @ec [in] entropy collector struct | 
 |  * @time [in] time stamp to be injected | 
 |  * @loop_cnt [in] if a value not equal to 0 is set, use the given value as | 
 |  *		  number of loops to perform the folding | 
 |  * @stuck [in] Is the time stamp identified as stuck? | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Output: | 
 |  * updated ec->data | 
 |  * | 
 |  * @return Number of loops the folding operation is performed | 
 |  */ | 
 | static void jent_lfsr_time(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 time, __u64 loop_cnt, | 
 | 			   int stuck) | 
 | { | 
 | 	unsigned int i; | 
 | 	__u64 j = 0; | 
 | 	__u64 new = 0; | 
 | #define MAX_FOLD_LOOP_BIT 4 | 
 | #define MIN_FOLD_LOOP_BIT 0 | 
 | 	__u64 fold_loop_cnt = | 
 | 		jent_loop_shuffle(ec, MAX_FOLD_LOOP_BIT, MIN_FOLD_LOOP_BIT); | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * testing purposes -- allow test app to set the counter, not | 
 | 	 * needed during runtime | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	if (loop_cnt) | 
 | 		fold_loop_cnt = loop_cnt; | 
 | 	for (j = 0; j < fold_loop_cnt; j++) { | 
 | 		new = ec->data; | 
 | 		for (i = 1; (DATA_SIZE_BITS) >= i; i++) { | 
 | 			__u64 tmp = time << (DATA_SIZE_BITS - i); | 
 |  | 
 | 			tmp = tmp >> (DATA_SIZE_BITS - 1); | 
 |  | 
 | 			/* | 
 | 			* Fibonacci LSFR with polynomial of | 
 | 			*  x^64 + x^61 + x^56 + x^31 + x^28 + x^23 + 1 which is | 
 | 			*  primitive according to | 
 | 			*   http://poincare.matf.bg.ac.rs/~ezivkovm/publications/primpol1.pdf | 
 | 			* (the shift values are the polynomial values minus one | 
 | 			* due to counting bits from 0 to 63). As the current | 
 | 			* position is always the LSB, the polynomial only needs | 
 | 			* to shift data in from the left without wrap. | 
 | 			*/ | 
 | 			tmp ^= ((new >> 63) & 1); | 
 | 			tmp ^= ((new >> 60) & 1); | 
 | 			tmp ^= ((new >> 55) & 1); | 
 | 			tmp ^= ((new >> 30) & 1); | 
 | 			tmp ^= ((new >> 27) & 1); | 
 | 			tmp ^= ((new >> 22) & 1); | 
 | 			new <<= 1; | 
 | 			new ^= tmp; | 
 | 		} | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * If the time stamp is stuck, do not finally insert the value into | 
 | 	 * the entropy pool. Although this operation should not do any harm | 
 | 	 * even when the time stamp has no entropy, SP800-90B requires that | 
 | 	 * any conditioning operation (SP800-90B considers the LFSR to be a | 
 | 	 * conditioning operation) to have an identical amount of input | 
 | 	 * data according to section 3.1.5. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	if (!stuck) | 
 | 		ec->data = new; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /* | 
 |  * Memory Access noise source -- this is a noise source based on variations in | 
 |  *				 memory access times | 
 |  * | 
 |  * This function performs memory accesses which will add to the timing | 
 |  * variations due to an unknown amount of CPU wait states that need to be | 
 |  * added when accessing memory. The memory size should be larger than the L1 | 
 |  * caches as outlined in the documentation and the associated testing. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * The L1 cache has a very high bandwidth, albeit its access rate is  usually | 
 |  * slower than accessing CPU registers. Therefore, L1 accesses only add minimal | 
 |  * variations as the CPU has hardly to wait. Starting with L2, significant | 
 |  * variations are added because L2 typically does not belong to the CPU any more | 
 |  * and therefore a wider range of CPU wait states is necessary for accesses. | 
 |  * L3 and real memory accesses have even a wider range of wait states. However, | 
 |  * to reliably access either L3 or memory, the ec->mem memory must be quite | 
 |  * large which is usually not desirable. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * @ec [in] Reference to the entropy collector with the memory access data -- if | 
 |  *	    the reference to the memory block to be accessed is NULL, this noise | 
 |  *	    source is disabled | 
 |  * @loop_cnt [in] if a value not equal to 0 is set, use the given value | 
 |  *		  number of loops to perform the LFSR | 
 |  */ | 
 | static void jent_memaccess(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 loop_cnt) | 
 | { | 
 | 	unsigned int wrap = 0; | 
 | 	__u64 i = 0; | 
 | #define MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT 7 | 
 | #define MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT 0 | 
 | 	__u64 acc_loop_cnt = | 
 | 		jent_loop_shuffle(ec, MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT, MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT); | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (NULL == ec || NULL == ec->mem) | 
 | 		return; | 
 | 	wrap = ec->memblocksize * ec->memblocks; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * testing purposes -- allow test app to set the counter, not | 
 | 	 * needed during runtime | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	if (loop_cnt) | 
 | 		acc_loop_cnt = loop_cnt; | 
 |  | 
 | 	for (i = 0; i < (ec->memaccessloops + acc_loop_cnt); i++) { | 
 | 		unsigned char *tmpval = ec->mem + ec->memlocation; | 
 | 		/* | 
 | 		 * memory access: just add 1 to one byte, | 
 | 		 * wrap at 255 -- memory access implies read | 
 | 		 * from and write to memory location | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		*tmpval = (*tmpval + 1) & 0xff; | 
 | 		/* | 
 | 		 * Addition of memblocksize - 1 to pointer | 
 | 		 * with wrap around logic to ensure that every | 
 | 		 * memory location is hit evenly | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		ec->memlocation = ec->memlocation + ec->memblocksize - 1; | 
 | 		ec->memlocation = ec->memlocation % wrap; | 
 | 	} | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /*************************************************************************** | 
 |  * Start of entropy processing logic | 
 |  ***************************************************************************/ | 
 | /* | 
 |  * This is the heart of the entropy generation: calculate time deltas and | 
 |  * use the CPU jitter in the time deltas. The jitter is injected into the | 
 |  * entropy pool. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * WARNING: ensure that ->prev_time is primed before using the output | 
 |  *	    of this function! This can be done by calling this function | 
 |  *	    and not using its result. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | 
 |  * | 
 |  * @return result of stuck test | 
 |  */ | 
 | static int jent_measure_jitter(struct rand_data *ec) | 
 | { | 
 | 	__u64 time = 0; | 
 | 	__u64 current_delta = 0; | 
 | 	int stuck; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* Invoke one noise source before time measurement to add variations */ | 
 | 	jent_memaccess(ec, 0); | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * Get time stamp and calculate time delta to previous | 
 | 	 * invocation to measure the timing variations | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	jent_get_nstime(&time); | 
 | 	current_delta = jent_delta(ec->prev_time, time); | 
 | 	ec->prev_time = time; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* Check whether we have a stuck measurement. */ | 
 | 	stuck = jent_stuck(ec, current_delta); | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* Now call the next noise sources which also injects the data */ | 
 | 	jent_lfsr_time(ec, current_delta, 0, stuck); | 
 |  | 
 | 	return stuck; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /* | 
 |  * Generator of one 64 bit random number | 
 |  * Function fills rand_data->data | 
 |  * | 
 |  * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | 
 |  */ | 
 | static void jent_gen_entropy(struct rand_data *ec) | 
 | { | 
 | 	unsigned int k = 0, safety_factor = 0; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (fips_enabled) | 
 | 		safety_factor = JENT_ENTROPY_SAFETY_FACTOR; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* priming of the ->prev_time value */ | 
 | 	jent_measure_jitter(ec); | 
 |  | 
 | 	while (!jent_health_failure(ec)) { | 
 | 		/* If a stuck measurement is received, repeat measurement */ | 
 | 		if (jent_measure_jitter(ec)) | 
 | 			continue; | 
 |  | 
 | 		/* | 
 | 		 * We multiply the loop value with ->osr to obtain the | 
 | 		 * oversampling rate requested by the caller | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		if (++k >= ((DATA_SIZE_BITS + safety_factor) * ec->osr)) | 
 | 			break; | 
 | 	} | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /* | 
 |  * Entry function: Obtain entropy for the caller. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * This function invokes the entropy gathering logic as often to generate | 
 |  * as many bytes as requested by the caller. The entropy gathering logic | 
 |  * creates 64 bit per invocation. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * This function truncates the last 64 bit entropy value output to the exact | 
 |  * size specified by the caller. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | 
 |  * @data [in] pointer to buffer for storing random data -- buffer must already | 
 |  *	      exist | 
 |  * @len [in] size of the buffer, specifying also the requested number of random | 
 |  *	     in bytes | 
 |  * | 
 |  * @return 0 when request is fulfilled or an error | 
 |  * | 
 |  * The following error codes can occur: | 
 |  *	-1	entropy_collector is NULL | 
 |  *	-2	RCT failed | 
 |  *	-3	APT test failed | 
 |  */ | 
 | int jent_read_entropy(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned char *data, | 
 | 		      unsigned int len) | 
 | { | 
 | 	unsigned char *p = data; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (!ec) | 
 | 		return -1; | 
 |  | 
 | 	while (len > 0) { | 
 | 		unsigned int tocopy; | 
 |  | 
 | 		jent_gen_entropy(ec); | 
 |  | 
 | 		if (jent_health_failure(ec)) { | 
 | 			int ret; | 
 |  | 
 | 			if (jent_rct_failure(ec)) | 
 | 				ret = -2; | 
 | 			else | 
 | 				ret = -3; | 
 |  | 
 | 			/* | 
 | 			 * Re-initialize the noise source | 
 | 			 * | 
 | 			 * If the health test fails, the Jitter RNG remains | 
 | 			 * in failure state and will return a health failure | 
 | 			 * during next invocation. | 
 | 			 */ | 
 | 			if (jent_entropy_init()) | 
 | 				return ret; | 
 |  | 
 | 			/* Set APT to initial state */ | 
 | 			jent_apt_reset(ec, 0); | 
 | 			ec->apt_base_set = 0; | 
 |  | 
 | 			/* Set RCT to initial state */ | 
 | 			ec->rct_count = 0; | 
 |  | 
 | 			/* Re-enable Jitter RNG */ | 
 | 			ec->health_failure = 0; | 
 |  | 
 | 			/* | 
 | 			 * Return the health test failure status to the | 
 | 			 * caller as the generated value is not appropriate. | 
 | 			 */ | 
 | 			return ret; | 
 | 		} | 
 |  | 
 | 		if ((DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8) < len) | 
 | 			tocopy = (DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8); | 
 | 		else | 
 | 			tocopy = len; | 
 | 		jent_memcpy(p, &ec->data, tocopy); | 
 |  | 
 | 		len -= tocopy; | 
 | 		p += tocopy; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	return 0; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /*************************************************************************** | 
 |  * Initialization logic | 
 |  ***************************************************************************/ | 
 |  | 
 | struct rand_data *jent_entropy_collector_alloc(unsigned int osr, | 
 | 					       unsigned int flags) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct rand_data *entropy_collector; | 
 |  | 
 | 	entropy_collector = jent_zalloc(sizeof(struct rand_data)); | 
 | 	if (!entropy_collector) | 
 | 		return NULL; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (!(flags & JENT_DISABLE_MEMORY_ACCESS)) { | 
 | 		/* Allocate memory for adding variations based on memory | 
 | 		 * access | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		entropy_collector->mem = jent_zalloc(JENT_MEMORY_SIZE); | 
 | 		if (!entropy_collector->mem) { | 
 | 			jent_zfree(entropy_collector); | 
 | 			return NULL; | 
 | 		} | 
 | 		entropy_collector->memblocksize = JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE; | 
 | 		entropy_collector->memblocks = JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS; | 
 | 		entropy_collector->memaccessloops = JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* verify and set the oversampling rate */ | 
 | 	if (osr == 0) | 
 | 		osr = 1; /* minimum sampling rate is 1 */ | 
 | 	entropy_collector->osr = osr; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* fill the data pad with non-zero values */ | 
 | 	jent_gen_entropy(entropy_collector); | 
 |  | 
 | 	return entropy_collector; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | void jent_entropy_collector_free(struct rand_data *entropy_collector) | 
 | { | 
 | 	jent_zfree(entropy_collector->mem); | 
 | 	entropy_collector->mem = NULL; | 
 | 	jent_zfree(entropy_collector); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | int jent_entropy_init(void) | 
 | { | 
 | 	int i; | 
 | 	__u64 delta_sum = 0; | 
 | 	__u64 old_delta = 0; | 
 | 	unsigned int nonstuck = 0; | 
 | 	int time_backwards = 0; | 
 | 	int count_mod = 0; | 
 | 	int count_stuck = 0; | 
 | 	struct rand_data ec = { 0 }; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* Required for RCT */ | 
 | 	ec.osr = 1; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* We could perform statistical tests here, but the problem is | 
 | 	 * that we only have a few loop counts to do testing. These | 
 | 	 * loop counts may show some slight skew and we produce | 
 | 	 * false positives. | 
 | 	 * | 
 | 	 * Moreover, only old systems show potentially problematic | 
 | 	 * jitter entropy that could potentially be caught here. But | 
 | 	 * the RNG is intended for hardware that is available or widely | 
 | 	 * used, but not old systems that are long out of favor. Thus, | 
 | 	 * no statistical tests. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * We could add a check for system capabilities such as clock_getres or | 
 | 	 * check for CONFIG_X86_TSC, but it does not make much sense as the | 
 | 	 * following sanity checks verify that we have a high-resolution | 
 | 	 * timer. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * TESTLOOPCOUNT needs some loops to identify edge systems. 100 is | 
 | 	 * definitely too little. | 
 | 	 * | 
 | 	 * SP800-90B requires at least 1024 initial test cycles. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | #define TESTLOOPCOUNT 1024 | 
 | #define CLEARCACHE 100 | 
 | 	for (i = 0; (TESTLOOPCOUNT + CLEARCACHE) > i; i++) { | 
 | 		__u64 time = 0; | 
 | 		__u64 time2 = 0; | 
 | 		__u64 delta = 0; | 
 | 		unsigned int lowdelta = 0; | 
 | 		int stuck; | 
 |  | 
 | 		/* Invoke core entropy collection logic */ | 
 | 		jent_get_nstime(&time); | 
 | 		ec.prev_time = time; | 
 | 		jent_lfsr_time(&ec, time, 0, 0); | 
 | 		jent_get_nstime(&time2); | 
 |  | 
 | 		/* test whether timer works */ | 
 | 		if (!time || !time2) | 
 | 			return JENT_ENOTIME; | 
 | 		delta = jent_delta(time, time2); | 
 | 		/* | 
 | 		 * test whether timer is fine grained enough to provide | 
 | 		 * delta even when called shortly after each other -- this | 
 | 		 * implies that we also have a high resolution timer | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		if (!delta) | 
 | 			return JENT_ECOARSETIME; | 
 |  | 
 | 		stuck = jent_stuck(&ec, delta); | 
 |  | 
 | 		/* | 
 | 		 * up to here we did not modify any variable that will be | 
 | 		 * evaluated later, but we already performed some work. Thus we | 
 | 		 * already have had an impact on the caches, branch prediction, | 
 | 		 * etc. with the goal to clear it to get the worst case | 
 | 		 * measurements. | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		if (i < CLEARCACHE) | 
 | 			continue; | 
 |  | 
 | 		if (stuck) | 
 | 			count_stuck++; | 
 | 		else { | 
 | 			nonstuck++; | 
 |  | 
 | 			/* | 
 | 			 * Ensure that the APT succeeded. | 
 | 			 * | 
 | 			 * With the check below that count_stuck must be less | 
 | 			 * than 10% of the overall generated raw entropy values | 
 | 			 * it is guaranteed that the APT is invoked at | 
 | 			 * floor((TESTLOOPCOUNT * 0.9) / 64) == 14 times. | 
 | 			 */ | 
 | 			if ((nonstuck % JENT_APT_WINDOW_SIZE) == 0) { | 
 | 				jent_apt_reset(&ec, | 
 | 					       delta & JENT_APT_WORD_MASK); | 
 | 				if (jent_health_failure(&ec)) | 
 | 					return JENT_EHEALTH; | 
 | 			} | 
 | 		} | 
 |  | 
 | 		/* Validate RCT */ | 
 | 		if (jent_rct_failure(&ec)) | 
 | 			return JENT_ERCT; | 
 |  | 
 | 		/* test whether we have an increasing timer */ | 
 | 		if (!(time2 > time)) | 
 | 			time_backwards++; | 
 |  | 
 | 		/* use 32 bit value to ensure compilation on 32 bit arches */ | 
 | 		lowdelta = time2 - time; | 
 | 		if (!(lowdelta % 100)) | 
 | 			count_mod++; | 
 |  | 
 | 		/* | 
 | 		 * ensure that we have a varying delta timer which is necessary | 
 | 		 * for the calculation of entropy -- perform this check | 
 | 		 * only after the first loop is executed as we need to prime | 
 | 		 * the old_data value | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		if (delta > old_delta) | 
 | 			delta_sum += (delta - old_delta); | 
 | 		else | 
 | 			delta_sum += (old_delta - delta); | 
 | 		old_delta = delta; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * we allow up to three times the time running backwards. | 
 | 	 * CLOCK_REALTIME is affected by adjtime and NTP operations. Thus, | 
 | 	 * if such an operation just happens to interfere with our test, it | 
 | 	 * should not fail. The value of 3 should cover the NTP case being | 
 | 	 * performed during our test run. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	if (time_backwards > 3) | 
 | 		return JENT_ENOMONOTONIC; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * Variations of deltas of time must on average be larger | 
 | 	 * than 1 to ensure the entropy estimation | 
 | 	 * implied with 1 is preserved | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	if ((delta_sum) <= 1) | 
 | 		return JENT_EVARVAR; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * Ensure that we have variations in the time stamp below 10 for at | 
 | 	 * least 10% of all checks -- on some platforms, the counter increments | 
 | 	 * in multiples of 100, but not always | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	if ((TESTLOOPCOUNT/10 * 9) < count_mod) | 
 | 		return JENT_ECOARSETIME; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * If we have more than 90% stuck results, then this Jitter RNG is | 
 | 	 * likely to not work well. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	if ((TESTLOOPCOUNT/10 * 9) < count_stuck) | 
 | 		return JENT_ESTUCK; | 
 |  | 
 | 	return 0; | 
 | } |