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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/*
* AES-CCM authenticated encryption and decryption
*
* Copyright 2026 Google LLC
*/
#ifndef _CRYPTO_AES_CCM_H
#define _CRYPTO_AES_CCM_H
#include <crypto/aes.h>
/**
* struct aes_ccm_key - A key prepared for AES-CCM encryption and decryption
*/
struct aes_ccm_key {
/* private: */
struct aes_enckey aes;
size_t authtag_len; /* Length of authentication tags in bytes */
};
/**
* struct aes_ccm_ctx - Context for incrementally en/decrypting a message
*/
struct aes_ccm_ctx {
/* private: */
/*
* Pointer to the key, which is assumed to live at least as long as this
* struct.
*/
const struct aes_ccm_key *key;
/*
* The current CBC-MAC chaining value. When not on a block boundary,
* the partial block has been XOR'ed into this. The number of partial
* bytes is 'partial_len'.
*/
u8 mac[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(__be64));
/* The current counter, a 128-bit big endian value */
u8 ctr[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(__be64));
/* Buffered keystream for partial block updates */
u8 keystream[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(__be64));
/* Encrypted counter of 0. This gets XOR'ed with the tag at the end. */
u8 s0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(__be64));
/* Number of associated data bytes remaining to be provided */
u64 ad_remaining;
/* Number of en/decrypted data bytes remaining to be provided */
u64 data_remaining;
/* Current partial block length, 0 <= partial_len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE */
u32 partial_len;
/* True if associated data padding has been done */
bool ad_padded;
};
/**
* aes_ccm_preparekey() - Prepare a key for AES-CCM encryption and decryption
* @key: (output) The key structure to initialize
* @in_key: The raw AES-CCM key
* @key_len: Length of the raw key in bytes: 16, 24, or 32
* @authtag_len: Length of the authentication tag in bytes:
* 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, or 16. 16 is recommended.
*
* Users should use memzero_explicit() to zeroize the key struct at the end of
* its lifetime. (But if this function fails, zeroization is unnecessary.)
*
* Context: Any context.
* Return:
* * 0 on success
* * -EINVAL if either of the lengths is invalid
*/
int __must_check aes_ccm_preparekey(struct aes_ccm_key *key, const u8 *in_key,
size_t key_len, size_t authtag_len);
/**
* aes_ccm_encrypt() - Encrypt a message with AES-CCM
* @dst: The destination ciphertext data. Can be in-place or out-of-place.
* For other overlaps the behavior is unspecified.
* @src: The source plaintext data
* @data_len: Length of plaintext in bytes (and ciphertext excluding the tag):
* at most 2^(120 - (8 * @nonce_len)) - 1
* @authtag: The output authentication tag. Length is the authtag_len that was
* passed to aes_ccm_preparekey(). Usually protocols using AES-CCM
* put the tag at the end of the ciphertext, in which case this should
* be set to @dst + @data_len and @dst must have room for the tag.
* @ad: The associated data
* @ad_len: Length of associated data in bytes
* @nonce: The nonce. All (key, nonce) pairs used MUST be distinct.
* @nonce_len: Length of the nonce in bytes: between 7 and 13 inclusive
* @key: The key, already prepared using aes_ccm_preparekey()
*
* Context: Any context.
* Return:
* * 0 on success
* * -EINVAL if @nonce_len is invalid
* * -EOVERFLOW if @data_len is too large for the selected @nonce_len
*/
int __must_check aes_ccm_encrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t data_len,
u8 *authtag, const u8 *ad, size_t ad_len,
const u8 *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const struct aes_ccm_key *key);
/**
* aes_ccm_decrypt() - Decrypt a message with AES-CCM
* @dst: The destination plaintext data. Can be in-place or out-of-place.
* For other overlaps the behavior is unspecified.
* @src: The source ciphertext data
* @data_len: Length of plaintext in bytes (and ciphertext excluding the tag):
* at most 2^(120 - (8 * @nonce_len)) - 1
* @authtag: The stored authentication tag. Length is the authtag_len that was
* passed to aes_ccm_preparekey(). Usually protocols using AES-CCM
* put the tag at the end of the ciphertext, in which case this should
* be set to @src + @data_len and @src must have room for the tag.
* @ad: The associated data
* @ad_len: Length of associated data in bytes
* @nonce: The nonce
* @nonce_len: Length of the nonce in bytes: between 7 and 13 inclusive
* @key: The key, already prepared using aes_ccm_preparekey()
*
* Context: Any context.
* Return:
* * 0 on success. This is the only case where any decrypted or associated data
* can be used.
* * -EBADMSG if the message is inauthentic
* * -EINVAL if @nonce_len is invalid
* * -EOVERFLOW if @data_len is too large for the selected @nonce_len
*/
int __must_check aes_ccm_decrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t data_len,
const u8 *authtag, const u8 *ad, size_t ad_len,
const u8 *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const struct aes_ccm_key *key);
/**
* aes_ccm_init() - Initialize context for incremental AES-CCM encryption or
* decryption
* @ctx: The context to initialize
* @data_len: Length of the en/decrypted data that will be provided in bytes:
* at most 2^(120 - (8 * @nonce_len)) - 1
* @ad_len: Length of the associated data that will be provided in bytes
* @nonce: The nonce. All (key, nonce) pairs used for encryption MUST be
* distinct.
* @nonce_len: Length of the nonce in bytes: between 7 and 13 inclusive
* @key: The key, already prepared using aes_ccm_preparekey(). Note that a
* pointer to the key is saved in the context, so the key must live at
* least as long as the context.
*
* Unlike AES-GCM, AES-CCM requires the total lengths of the associated data and
* the en/decrypted data to be known during initialization. Callers MUST ensure
* that these lengths are correct.
*
* If this function returns success, the context should be zeroized at the end
* of its lifetime. Normally that happens in aes_ccm_encrypt_final() or
* aes_ccm_decrypt_final(), but callers that abandon a context without
* finalizing it should explicitly zeroize it.
*
* IMPORTANT: Callers that are decrypting MUST NOT assume that any decrypted or
* associated data is authentic until the authentication tag has been verified.
* This incremental API is provided solely to support callers that can't
* efficiently use the one-shot functions due to using a nonlinear data layout.
*
* For incremental AES-CCM encryption, use:
*
* 1. aes_ccm_init()
* 2. aes_ccm_auth_update() (any number of times)
* 3. aes_ccm_encrypt_update() (any number of times)
* 4. aes_ccm_encrypt_final()
*
* For incremental AES-CCM decryption, use:
*
* 1. aes_ccm_init()
* 2. aes_ccm_auth_update() (any number of times)
* 3. aes_ccm_decrypt_update() (any number of times)
* 4. aes_ccm_decrypt_final()
*
* Context: Any context.
* Return:
* * 0 on success
* * -EINVAL if @nonce_len is invalid
* * -EOVERFLOW if @data_len is too large for the selected @nonce_len
*/
int __must_check aes_ccm_init(struct aes_ccm_ctx *ctx, u64 data_len, u64 ad_len,
const u8 *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const struct aes_ccm_key *key);
/**
* aes_ccm_auth_update() - Incrementally process AES-CCM associated data
* @ctx: An AES-CCM context
* @ad: The associated data
* @len: Length of the associated data in bytes
*
* IMPORTANT: Callers MUST NOT assume that any decrypted or associated data is
* authentic until the authentication tag has been verified.
*
* The total length of the associated data (over all calls to this function)
* MUST match the ad_len that was passed to aes_ccm_init().
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
void aes_ccm_auth_update(struct aes_ccm_ctx *ctx, const u8 *ad, size_t len);
/**
* aes_ccm_encrypt_update() - Incrementally encrypt data with AES-CCM
* @ctx: An AES-CCM context
* @dst: The destination buffer. Can be in-place or out-of-place. For other
* overlaps the behavior is unspecified.
* @src: The source plaintext data
* @len: Number of bytes to encrypt
*
* This can be called only after all associated data has been processed.
*
* The total length of the encrypted data (over all calls to this function) MUST
* match the data_len that was passed to aes_ccm_init().
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
void aes_ccm_encrypt_update(struct aes_ccm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
size_t len);
/**
* aes_ccm_decrypt_update() - Incrementally decrypt data with AES-CCM
* @ctx: An AES-CCM context
* @dst: The destination buffer. Can be in-place or out-of-place. For other
* overlaps the behavior is unspecified.
* @src: The source ciphertext data (not including auth tag)
* @len: Number of bytes to decrypt
*
* This can be called only after all associated data has been processed.
*
* The total length of the decrypted data (over all calls to this function) MUST
* match the data_len that was passed to aes_ccm_init().
*
* IMPORTANT: Callers MUST NOT assume that any decrypted or associated data is
* authentic until the authentication tag has been verified.
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
void aes_ccm_decrypt_update(struct aes_ccm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
size_t len);
/**
* aes_ccm_encrypt_final() - Finish encrypting a message with AES-CCM
* @ctx: An AES-CCM context
* @authtag: The output authentication tag. Length is the authtag_len that was
* passed to aes_ccm_preparekey().
*
* This also zeroizes @ctx, so the caller doesn't need to do it.
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
void aes_ccm_encrypt_final(struct aes_ccm_ctx *ctx, u8 *authtag);
/**
* aes_ccm_decrypt_final() - Finish decrypting a message with AES-CCM
* @ctx: An AES-CCM context
* @authtag: The stored authentication tag. Length is the authtag_len that was
* passed to aes_ccm_preparekey().
*
* This also zeroizes @ctx, so the caller doesn't need to do it.
*
* Context: Any context.
* Return:
* * 0 on success. This is the only case where any decrypted or associated data
* can be used.
* * -EBADMSG if the message is inauthentic
*/
int __must_check aes_ccm_decrypt_final(struct aes_ccm_ctx *ctx,
const u8 *authtag);
#endif /* _CRYPTO_AES_CCM_H */