|  | /* | 
|  | * Non-physical true random number generator based on timing jitter -- | 
|  | * Jitter RNG standalone code. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * Copyright Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>, 2015 - 2020 | 
|  | * | 
|  | * Design | 
|  | * ====== | 
|  | * | 
|  | * See https://www.chronox.de/jent.html | 
|  | * | 
|  | * License | 
|  | * ======= | 
|  | * | 
|  | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | 
|  | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | 
|  | * are met: | 
|  | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | 
|  | *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety, | 
|  | *    including the disclaimer of warranties. | 
|  | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | 
|  | *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | 
|  | *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | 
|  | * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote | 
|  | *    products derived from this software without specific prior | 
|  | *    written permission. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of | 
|  | * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2 are | 
|  | * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is | 
|  | * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and | 
|  | * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.) | 
|  | * | 
|  | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED | 
|  | * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES | 
|  | * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF | 
|  | * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE | 
|  | * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR | 
|  | * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT | 
|  | * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR | 
|  | * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF | 
|  | * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT | 
|  | * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE | 
|  | * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH | 
|  | * DAMAGE. | 
|  | */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * This Jitterentropy RNG is based on the jitterentropy library | 
|  | * version 2.2.0 provided at https://www.chronox.de/jent.html | 
|  | */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | #ifdef __OPTIMIZE__ | 
|  | #error "The CPU Jitter random number generator must not be compiled with optimizations. See documentation. Use the compiler switch -O0 for compiling jitterentropy.c." | 
|  | #endif | 
|  |  | 
|  | typedef	unsigned long long	__u64; | 
|  | typedef	long long		__s64; | 
|  | typedef	unsigned int		__u32; | 
|  | #define NULL    ((void *) 0) | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* The entropy pool */ | 
|  | struct rand_data { | 
|  | /* all data values that are vital to maintain the security | 
|  | * of the RNG are marked as SENSITIVE. A user must not | 
|  | * access that information while the RNG executes its loops to | 
|  | * calculate the next random value. */ | 
|  | __u64 data;		/* SENSITIVE Actual random number */ | 
|  | __u64 old_data;		/* SENSITIVE Previous random number */ | 
|  | __u64 prev_time;	/* SENSITIVE Previous time stamp */ | 
|  | #define DATA_SIZE_BITS ((sizeof(__u64)) * 8) | 
|  | __u64 last_delta;	/* SENSITIVE stuck test */ | 
|  | __s64 last_delta2;	/* SENSITIVE stuck test */ | 
|  | unsigned int osr;	/* Oversample rate */ | 
|  | #define JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS 64 | 
|  | #define JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE 32 | 
|  | #define JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS 128 | 
|  | #define JENT_MEMORY_SIZE (JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS*JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE) | 
|  | unsigned char *mem;	/* Memory access location with size of | 
|  | * memblocks * memblocksize */ | 
|  | unsigned int memlocation; /* Pointer to byte in *mem */ | 
|  | unsigned int memblocks;	/* Number of memory blocks in *mem */ | 
|  | unsigned int memblocksize; /* Size of one memory block in bytes */ | 
|  | unsigned int memaccessloops; /* Number of memory accesses per random | 
|  | * bit generation */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Repetition Count Test */ | 
|  | int rct_count;			/* Number of stuck values */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Adaptive Proportion Test for a significance level of 2^-30 */ | 
|  | #define JENT_APT_CUTOFF		325	/* Taken from SP800-90B sec 4.4.2 */ | 
|  | #define JENT_APT_WINDOW_SIZE	512	/* Data window size */ | 
|  | /* LSB of time stamp to process */ | 
|  | #define JENT_APT_LSB		16 | 
|  | #define JENT_APT_WORD_MASK	(JENT_APT_LSB - 1) | 
|  | unsigned int apt_observations;	/* Number of collected observations */ | 
|  | unsigned int apt_count;		/* APT counter */ | 
|  | unsigned int apt_base;		/* APT base reference */ | 
|  | unsigned int apt_base_set:1;	/* APT base reference set? */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | unsigned int health_failure:1;	/* Permanent health failure */ | 
|  | }; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Flags that can be used to initialize the RNG */ | 
|  | #define JENT_DISABLE_MEMORY_ACCESS (1<<2) /* Disable memory access for more | 
|  | * entropy, saves MEMORY_SIZE RAM for | 
|  | * entropy collector */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* -- error codes for init function -- */ | 
|  | #define JENT_ENOTIME		1 /* Timer service not available */ | 
|  | #define JENT_ECOARSETIME	2 /* Timer too coarse for RNG */ | 
|  | #define JENT_ENOMONOTONIC	3 /* Timer is not monotonic increasing */ | 
|  | #define JENT_EVARVAR		5 /* Timer does not produce variations of | 
|  | * variations (2nd derivation of time is | 
|  | * zero). */ | 
|  | #define JENT_ESTUCK		8 /* Too many stuck results during init. */ | 
|  | #define JENT_EHEALTH		9 /* Health test failed during initialization */ | 
|  | #define JENT_ERCT		10 /* RCT failed during initialization */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * The output n bits can receive more than n bits of min entropy, of course, | 
|  | * but the fixed output of the conditioning function can only asymptotically | 
|  | * approach the output size bits of min entropy, not attain that bound. Random | 
|  | * maps will tend to have output collisions, which reduces the creditable | 
|  | * output entropy (that is what SP 800-90B Section 3.1.5.1.2 attempts to bound). | 
|  | * | 
|  | * The value "64" is justified in Appendix A.4 of the current 90C draft, | 
|  | * and aligns with NIST's in "epsilon" definition in this document, which is | 
|  | * that a string can be considered "full entropy" if you can bound the min | 
|  | * entropy in each bit of output to at least 1-epsilon, where epsilon is | 
|  | * required to be <= 2^(-32). | 
|  | */ | 
|  | #define JENT_ENTROPY_SAFETY_FACTOR	64 | 
|  |  | 
|  | #include <linux/fips.h> | 
|  | #include "jitterentropy.h" | 
|  |  | 
|  | /*************************************************************************** | 
|  | * Adaptive Proportion Test | 
|  | * | 
|  | * This test complies with SP800-90B section 4.4.2. | 
|  | ***************************************************************************/ | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Reset the APT counter | 
|  | * | 
|  | * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | 
|  | */ | 
|  | static void jent_apt_reset(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned int delta_masked) | 
|  | { | 
|  | /* Reset APT counter */ | 
|  | ec->apt_count = 0; | 
|  | ec->apt_base = delta_masked; | 
|  | ec->apt_observations = 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Insert a new entropy event into APT | 
|  | * | 
|  | * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | 
|  | * @delta_masked [in] Masked time delta to process | 
|  | */ | 
|  | static void jent_apt_insert(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned int delta_masked) | 
|  | { | 
|  | /* Initialize the base reference */ | 
|  | if (!ec->apt_base_set) { | 
|  | ec->apt_base = delta_masked; | 
|  | ec->apt_base_set = 1; | 
|  | return; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (delta_masked == ec->apt_base) { | 
|  | ec->apt_count++; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (ec->apt_count >= JENT_APT_CUTOFF) | 
|  | ec->health_failure = 1; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | ec->apt_observations++; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (ec->apt_observations >= JENT_APT_WINDOW_SIZE) | 
|  | jent_apt_reset(ec, delta_masked); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /*************************************************************************** | 
|  | * Stuck Test and its use as Repetition Count Test | 
|  | * | 
|  | * The Jitter RNG uses an enhanced version of the Repetition Count Test | 
|  | * (RCT) specified in SP800-90B section 4.4.1. Instead of counting identical | 
|  | * back-to-back values, the input to the RCT is the counting of the stuck | 
|  | * values during the generation of one Jitter RNG output block. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * The RCT is applied with an alpha of 2^{-30} compliant to FIPS 140-2 IG 9.8. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * During the counting operation, the Jitter RNG always calculates the RCT | 
|  | * cut-off value of C. If that value exceeds the allowed cut-off value, | 
|  | * the Jitter RNG output block will be calculated completely but discarded at | 
|  | * the end. The caller of the Jitter RNG is informed with an error code. | 
|  | ***************************************************************************/ | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Repetition Count Test as defined in SP800-90B section 4.4.1 | 
|  | * | 
|  | * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | 
|  | * @stuck [in] Indicator whether the value is stuck | 
|  | */ | 
|  | static void jent_rct_insert(struct rand_data *ec, int stuck) | 
|  | { | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * If we have a count less than zero, a previous RCT round identified | 
|  | * a failure. We will not overwrite it. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if (ec->rct_count < 0) | 
|  | return; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (stuck) { | 
|  | ec->rct_count++; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * The cutoff value is based on the following consideration: | 
|  | * alpha = 2^-30 as recommended in FIPS 140-2 IG 9.8. | 
|  | * In addition, we require an entropy value H of 1/OSR as this | 
|  | * is the minimum entropy required to provide full entropy. | 
|  | * Note, we collect 64 * OSR deltas for inserting them into | 
|  | * the entropy pool which should then have (close to) 64 bits | 
|  | * of entropy. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * Note, ec->rct_count (which equals to value B in the pseudo | 
|  | * code of SP800-90B section 4.4.1) starts with zero. Hence | 
|  | * we need to subtract one from the cutoff value as calculated | 
|  | * following SP800-90B. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if ((unsigned int)ec->rct_count >= (31 * ec->osr)) { | 
|  | ec->rct_count = -1; | 
|  | ec->health_failure = 1; | 
|  | } | 
|  | } else { | 
|  | ec->rct_count = 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Is there an RCT health test failure? | 
|  | * | 
|  | * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | 
|  | * | 
|  | * @return | 
|  | * 	0 No health test failure | 
|  | * 	1 Permanent health test failure | 
|  | */ | 
|  | static int jent_rct_failure(struct rand_data *ec) | 
|  | { | 
|  | if (ec->rct_count < 0) | 
|  | return 1; | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static inline __u64 jent_delta(__u64 prev, __u64 next) | 
|  | { | 
|  | #define JENT_UINT64_MAX		(__u64)(~((__u64) 0)) | 
|  | return (prev < next) ? (next - prev) : | 
|  | (JENT_UINT64_MAX - prev + 1 + next); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Stuck test by checking the: | 
|  | * 	1st derivative of the jitter measurement (time delta) | 
|  | * 	2nd derivative of the jitter measurement (delta of time deltas) | 
|  | * 	3rd derivative of the jitter measurement (delta of delta of time deltas) | 
|  | * | 
|  | * All values must always be non-zero. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | 
|  | * @current_delta [in] Jitter time delta | 
|  | * | 
|  | * @return | 
|  | * 	0 jitter measurement not stuck (good bit) | 
|  | * 	1 jitter measurement stuck (reject bit) | 
|  | */ | 
|  | static int jent_stuck(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 current_delta) | 
|  | { | 
|  | __u64 delta2 = jent_delta(ec->last_delta, current_delta); | 
|  | __u64 delta3 = jent_delta(ec->last_delta2, delta2); | 
|  |  | 
|  | ec->last_delta = current_delta; | 
|  | ec->last_delta2 = delta2; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Insert the result of the comparison of two back-to-back time | 
|  | * deltas. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | jent_apt_insert(ec, current_delta); | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!current_delta || !delta2 || !delta3) { | 
|  | /* RCT with a stuck bit */ | 
|  | jent_rct_insert(ec, 1); | 
|  | return 1; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* RCT with a non-stuck bit */ | 
|  | jent_rct_insert(ec, 0); | 
|  |  | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Report any health test failures | 
|  | * | 
|  | * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | 
|  | * | 
|  | * @return | 
|  | * 	0 No health test failure | 
|  | * 	1 Permanent health test failure | 
|  | */ | 
|  | static int jent_health_failure(struct rand_data *ec) | 
|  | { | 
|  | return ec->health_failure; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /*************************************************************************** | 
|  | * Noise sources | 
|  | ***************************************************************************/ | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Update of the loop count used for the next round of | 
|  | * an entropy collection. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * Input: | 
|  | * @ec entropy collector struct -- may be NULL | 
|  | * @bits is the number of low bits of the timer to consider | 
|  | * @min is the number of bits we shift the timer value to the right at | 
|  | *	the end to make sure we have a guaranteed minimum value | 
|  | * | 
|  | * @return Newly calculated loop counter | 
|  | */ | 
|  | static __u64 jent_loop_shuffle(struct rand_data *ec, | 
|  | unsigned int bits, unsigned int min) | 
|  | { | 
|  | __u64 time = 0; | 
|  | __u64 shuffle = 0; | 
|  | unsigned int i = 0; | 
|  | unsigned int mask = (1<<bits) - 1; | 
|  |  | 
|  | jent_get_nstime(&time); | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Mix the current state of the random number into the shuffle | 
|  | * calculation to balance that shuffle a bit more. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if (ec) | 
|  | time ^= ec->data; | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * We fold the time value as much as possible to ensure that as many | 
|  | * bits of the time stamp are included as possible. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | for (i = 0; ((DATA_SIZE_BITS + bits - 1) / bits) > i; i++) { | 
|  | shuffle ^= time & mask; | 
|  | time = time >> bits; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * We add a lower boundary value to ensure we have a minimum | 
|  | * RNG loop count. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | return (shuffle + (1<<min)); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * CPU Jitter noise source -- this is the noise source based on the CPU | 
|  | *			      execution time jitter | 
|  | * | 
|  | * This function injects the individual bits of the time value into the | 
|  | * entropy pool using an LFSR. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * The code is deliberately inefficient with respect to the bit shifting | 
|  | * and shall stay that way. This function is the root cause why the code | 
|  | * shall be compiled without optimization. This function not only acts as | 
|  | * folding operation, but this function's execution is used to measure | 
|  | * the CPU execution time jitter. Any change to the loop in this function | 
|  | * implies that careful retesting must be done. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * @ec [in] entropy collector struct | 
|  | * @time [in] time stamp to be injected | 
|  | * @loop_cnt [in] if a value not equal to 0 is set, use the given value as | 
|  | *		  number of loops to perform the folding | 
|  | * @stuck [in] Is the time stamp identified as stuck? | 
|  | * | 
|  | * Output: | 
|  | * updated ec->data | 
|  | * | 
|  | * @return Number of loops the folding operation is performed | 
|  | */ | 
|  | static void jent_lfsr_time(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 time, __u64 loop_cnt, | 
|  | int stuck) | 
|  | { | 
|  | unsigned int i; | 
|  | __u64 j = 0; | 
|  | __u64 new = 0; | 
|  | #define MAX_FOLD_LOOP_BIT 4 | 
|  | #define MIN_FOLD_LOOP_BIT 0 | 
|  | __u64 fold_loop_cnt = | 
|  | jent_loop_shuffle(ec, MAX_FOLD_LOOP_BIT, MIN_FOLD_LOOP_BIT); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * testing purposes -- allow test app to set the counter, not | 
|  | * needed during runtime | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if (loop_cnt) | 
|  | fold_loop_cnt = loop_cnt; | 
|  | for (j = 0; j < fold_loop_cnt; j++) { | 
|  | new = ec->data; | 
|  | for (i = 1; (DATA_SIZE_BITS) >= i; i++) { | 
|  | __u64 tmp = time << (DATA_SIZE_BITS - i); | 
|  |  | 
|  | tmp = tmp >> (DATA_SIZE_BITS - 1); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Fibonacci LSFR with polynomial of | 
|  | *  x^64 + x^61 + x^56 + x^31 + x^28 + x^23 + 1 which is | 
|  | *  primitive according to | 
|  | *   http://poincare.matf.bg.ac.rs/~ezivkovm/publications/primpol1.pdf | 
|  | * (the shift values are the polynomial values minus one | 
|  | * due to counting bits from 0 to 63). As the current | 
|  | * position is always the LSB, the polynomial only needs | 
|  | * to shift data in from the left without wrap. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | tmp ^= ((new >> 63) & 1); | 
|  | tmp ^= ((new >> 60) & 1); | 
|  | tmp ^= ((new >> 55) & 1); | 
|  | tmp ^= ((new >> 30) & 1); | 
|  | tmp ^= ((new >> 27) & 1); | 
|  | tmp ^= ((new >> 22) & 1); | 
|  | new <<= 1; | 
|  | new ^= tmp; | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * If the time stamp is stuck, do not finally insert the value into | 
|  | * the entropy pool. Although this operation should not do any harm | 
|  | * even when the time stamp has no entropy, SP800-90B requires that | 
|  | * any conditioning operation (SP800-90B considers the LFSR to be a | 
|  | * conditioning operation) to have an identical amount of input | 
|  | * data according to section 3.1.5. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if (!stuck) | 
|  | ec->data = new; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Memory Access noise source -- this is a noise source based on variations in | 
|  | *				 memory access times | 
|  | * | 
|  | * This function performs memory accesses which will add to the timing | 
|  | * variations due to an unknown amount of CPU wait states that need to be | 
|  | * added when accessing memory. The memory size should be larger than the L1 | 
|  | * caches as outlined in the documentation and the associated testing. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * The L1 cache has a very high bandwidth, albeit its access rate is  usually | 
|  | * slower than accessing CPU registers. Therefore, L1 accesses only add minimal | 
|  | * variations as the CPU has hardly to wait. Starting with L2, significant | 
|  | * variations are added because L2 typically does not belong to the CPU any more | 
|  | * and therefore a wider range of CPU wait states is necessary for accesses. | 
|  | * L3 and real memory accesses have even a wider range of wait states. However, | 
|  | * to reliably access either L3 or memory, the ec->mem memory must be quite | 
|  | * large which is usually not desirable. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * @ec [in] Reference to the entropy collector with the memory access data -- if | 
|  | *	    the reference to the memory block to be accessed is NULL, this noise | 
|  | *	    source is disabled | 
|  | * @loop_cnt [in] if a value not equal to 0 is set, use the given value | 
|  | *		  number of loops to perform the LFSR | 
|  | */ | 
|  | static void jent_memaccess(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 loop_cnt) | 
|  | { | 
|  | unsigned int wrap = 0; | 
|  | __u64 i = 0; | 
|  | #define MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT 7 | 
|  | #define MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT 0 | 
|  | __u64 acc_loop_cnt = | 
|  | jent_loop_shuffle(ec, MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT, MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT); | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (NULL == ec || NULL == ec->mem) | 
|  | return; | 
|  | wrap = ec->memblocksize * ec->memblocks; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * testing purposes -- allow test app to set the counter, not | 
|  | * needed during runtime | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if (loop_cnt) | 
|  | acc_loop_cnt = loop_cnt; | 
|  |  | 
|  | for (i = 0; i < (ec->memaccessloops + acc_loop_cnt); i++) { | 
|  | unsigned char *tmpval = ec->mem + ec->memlocation; | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * memory access: just add 1 to one byte, | 
|  | * wrap at 255 -- memory access implies read | 
|  | * from and write to memory location | 
|  | */ | 
|  | *tmpval = (*tmpval + 1) & 0xff; | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Addition of memblocksize - 1 to pointer | 
|  | * with wrap around logic to ensure that every | 
|  | * memory location is hit evenly | 
|  | */ | 
|  | ec->memlocation = ec->memlocation + ec->memblocksize - 1; | 
|  | ec->memlocation = ec->memlocation % wrap; | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /*************************************************************************** | 
|  | * Start of entropy processing logic | 
|  | ***************************************************************************/ | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * This is the heart of the entropy generation: calculate time deltas and | 
|  | * use the CPU jitter in the time deltas. The jitter is injected into the | 
|  | * entropy pool. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * WARNING: ensure that ->prev_time is primed before using the output | 
|  | *	    of this function! This can be done by calling this function | 
|  | *	    and not using its result. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | 
|  | * | 
|  | * @return result of stuck test | 
|  | */ | 
|  | static int jent_measure_jitter(struct rand_data *ec) | 
|  | { | 
|  | __u64 time = 0; | 
|  | __u64 current_delta = 0; | 
|  | int stuck; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Invoke one noise source before time measurement to add variations */ | 
|  | jent_memaccess(ec, 0); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Get time stamp and calculate time delta to previous | 
|  | * invocation to measure the timing variations | 
|  | */ | 
|  | jent_get_nstime(&time); | 
|  | current_delta = jent_delta(ec->prev_time, time); | 
|  | ec->prev_time = time; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Check whether we have a stuck measurement. */ | 
|  | stuck = jent_stuck(ec, current_delta); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Now call the next noise sources which also injects the data */ | 
|  | jent_lfsr_time(ec, current_delta, 0, stuck); | 
|  |  | 
|  | return stuck; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Generator of one 64 bit random number | 
|  | * Function fills rand_data->data | 
|  | * | 
|  | * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | 
|  | */ | 
|  | static void jent_gen_entropy(struct rand_data *ec) | 
|  | { | 
|  | unsigned int k = 0, safety_factor = 0; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (fips_enabled) | 
|  | safety_factor = JENT_ENTROPY_SAFETY_FACTOR; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* priming of the ->prev_time value */ | 
|  | jent_measure_jitter(ec); | 
|  |  | 
|  | while (!jent_health_failure(ec)) { | 
|  | /* If a stuck measurement is received, repeat measurement */ | 
|  | if (jent_measure_jitter(ec)) | 
|  | continue; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * We multiply the loop value with ->osr to obtain the | 
|  | * oversampling rate requested by the caller | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if (++k >= ((DATA_SIZE_BITS + safety_factor) * ec->osr)) | 
|  | break; | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Entry function: Obtain entropy for the caller. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * This function invokes the entropy gathering logic as often to generate | 
|  | * as many bytes as requested by the caller. The entropy gathering logic | 
|  | * creates 64 bit per invocation. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * This function truncates the last 64 bit entropy value output to the exact | 
|  | * size specified by the caller. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | 
|  | * @data [in] pointer to buffer for storing random data -- buffer must already | 
|  | *	      exist | 
|  | * @len [in] size of the buffer, specifying also the requested number of random | 
|  | *	     in bytes | 
|  | * | 
|  | * @return 0 when request is fulfilled or an error | 
|  | * | 
|  | * The following error codes can occur: | 
|  | *	-1	entropy_collector is NULL | 
|  | *	-2	RCT failed | 
|  | *	-3	APT test failed | 
|  | */ | 
|  | int jent_read_entropy(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned char *data, | 
|  | unsigned int len) | 
|  | { | 
|  | unsigned char *p = data; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!ec) | 
|  | return -1; | 
|  |  | 
|  | while (len > 0) { | 
|  | unsigned int tocopy; | 
|  |  | 
|  | jent_gen_entropy(ec); | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (jent_health_failure(ec)) { | 
|  | int ret; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (jent_rct_failure(ec)) | 
|  | ret = -2; | 
|  | else | 
|  | ret = -3; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Re-initialize the noise source | 
|  | * | 
|  | * If the health test fails, the Jitter RNG remains | 
|  | * in failure state and will return a health failure | 
|  | * during next invocation. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if (jent_entropy_init()) | 
|  | return ret; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Set APT to initial state */ | 
|  | jent_apt_reset(ec, 0); | 
|  | ec->apt_base_set = 0; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Set RCT to initial state */ | 
|  | ec->rct_count = 0; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Re-enable Jitter RNG */ | 
|  | ec->health_failure = 0; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Return the health test failure status to the | 
|  | * caller as the generated value is not appropriate. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | return ret; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | if ((DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8) < len) | 
|  | tocopy = (DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8); | 
|  | else | 
|  | tocopy = len; | 
|  | jent_memcpy(p, &ec->data, tocopy); | 
|  |  | 
|  | len -= tocopy; | 
|  | p += tocopy; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /*************************************************************************** | 
|  | * Initialization logic | 
|  | ***************************************************************************/ | 
|  |  | 
|  | struct rand_data *jent_entropy_collector_alloc(unsigned int osr, | 
|  | unsigned int flags) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct rand_data *entropy_collector; | 
|  |  | 
|  | entropy_collector = jent_zalloc(sizeof(struct rand_data)); | 
|  | if (!entropy_collector) | 
|  | return NULL; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!(flags & JENT_DISABLE_MEMORY_ACCESS)) { | 
|  | /* Allocate memory for adding variations based on memory | 
|  | * access | 
|  | */ | 
|  | entropy_collector->mem = jent_zalloc(JENT_MEMORY_SIZE); | 
|  | if (!entropy_collector->mem) { | 
|  | jent_zfree(entropy_collector); | 
|  | return NULL; | 
|  | } | 
|  | entropy_collector->memblocksize = JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE; | 
|  | entropy_collector->memblocks = JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS; | 
|  | entropy_collector->memaccessloops = JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* verify and set the oversampling rate */ | 
|  | if (osr == 0) | 
|  | osr = 1; /* minimum sampling rate is 1 */ | 
|  | entropy_collector->osr = osr; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* fill the data pad with non-zero values */ | 
|  | jent_gen_entropy(entropy_collector); | 
|  |  | 
|  | return entropy_collector; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | void jent_entropy_collector_free(struct rand_data *entropy_collector) | 
|  | { | 
|  | jent_zfree(entropy_collector->mem); | 
|  | entropy_collector->mem = NULL; | 
|  | jent_zfree(entropy_collector); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | int jent_entropy_init(void) | 
|  | { | 
|  | int i; | 
|  | __u64 delta_sum = 0; | 
|  | __u64 old_delta = 0; | 
|  | unsigned int nonstuck = 0; | 
|  | int time_backwards = 0; | 
|  | int count_mod = 0; | 
|  | int count_stuck = 0; | 
|  | struct rand_data ec = { 0 }; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Required for RCT */ | 
|  | ec.osr = 1; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* We could perform statistical tests here, but the problem is | 
|  | * that we only have a few loop counts to do testing. These | 
|  | * loop counts may show some slight skew and we produce | 
|  | * false positives. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * Moreover, only old systems show potentially problematic | 
|  | * jitter entropy that could potentially be caught here. But | 
|  | * the RNG is intended for hardware that is available or widely | 
|  | * used, but not old systems that are long out of favor. Thus, | 
|  | * no statistical tests. | 
|  | */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * We could add a check for system capabilities such as clock_getres or | 
|  | * check for CONFIG_X86_TSC, but it does not make much sense as the | 
|  | * following sanity checks verify that we have a high-resolution | 
|  | * timer. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * TESTLOOPCOUNT needs some loops to identify edge systems. 100 is | 
|  | * definitely too little. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * SP800-90B requires at least 1024 initial test cycles. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | #define TESTLOOPCOUNT 1024 | 
|  | #define CLEARCACHE 100 | 
|  | for (i = 0; (TESTLOOPCOUNT + CLEARCACHE) > i; i++) { | 
|  | __u64 time = 0; | 
|  | __u64 time2 = 0; | 
|  | __u64 delta = 0; | 
|  | unsigned int lowdelta = 0; | 
|  | int stuck; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Invoke core entropy collection logic */ | 
|  | jent_get_nstime(&time); | 
|  | ec.prev_time = time; | 
|  | jent_lfsr_time(&ec, time, 0, 0); | 
|  | jent_get_nstime(&time2); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* test whether timer works */ | 
|  | if (!time || !time2) | 
|  | return JENT_ENOTIME; | 
|  | delta = jent_delta(time, time2); | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * test whether timer is fine grained enough to provide | 
|  | * delta even when called shortly after each other -- this | 
|  | * implies that we also have a high resolution timer | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if (!delta) | 
|  | return JENT_ECOARSETIME; | 
|  |  | 
|  | stuck = jent_stuck(&ec, delta); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * up to here we did not modify any variable that will be | 
|  | * evaluated later, but we already performed some work. Thus we | 
|  | * already have had an impact on the caches, branch prediction, | 
|  | * etc. with the goal to clear it to get the worst case | 
|  | * measurements. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if (i < CLEARCACHE) | 
|  | continue; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (stuck) | 
|  | count_stuck++; | 
|  | else { | 
|  | nonstuck++; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Ensure that the APT succeeded. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * With the check below that count_stuck must be less | 
|  | * than 10% of the overall generated raw entropy values | 
|  | * it is guaranteed that the APT is invoked at | 
|  | * floor((TESTLOOPCOUNT * 0.9) / 64) == 14 times. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if ((nonstuck % JENT_APT_WINDOW_SIZE) == 0) { | 
|  | jent_apt_reset(&ec, | 
|  | delta & JENT_APT_WORD_MASK); | 
|  | if (jent_health_failure(&ec)) | 
|  | return JENT_EHEALTH; | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Validate RCT */ | 
|  | if (jent_rct_failure(&ec)) | 
|  | return JENT_ERCT; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* test whether we have an increasing timer */ | 
|  | if (!(time2 > time)) | 
|  | time_backwards++; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* use 32 bit value to ensure compilation on 32 bit arches */ | 
|  | lowdelta = time2 - time; | 
|  | if (!(lowdelta % 100)) | 
|  | count_mod++; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * ensure that we have a varying delta timer which is necessary | 
|  | * for the calculation of entropy -- perform this check | 
|  | * only after the first loop is executed as we need to prime | 
|  | * the old_data value | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if (delta > old_delta) | 
|  | delta_sum += (delta - old_delta); | 
|  | else | 
|  | delta_sum += (old_delta - delta); | 
|  | old_delta = delta; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * we allow up to three times the time running backwards. | 
|  | * CLOCK_REALTIME is affected by adjtime and NTP operations. Thus, | 
|  | * if such an operation just happens to interfere with our test, it | 
|  | * should not fail. The value of 3 should cover the NTP case being | 
|  | * performed during our test run. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if (time_backwards > 3) | 
|  | return JENT_ENOMONOTONIC; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Variations of deltas of time must on average be larger | 
|  | * than 1 to ensure the entropy estimation | 
|  | * implied with 1 is preserved | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if ((delta_sum) <= 1) | 
|  | return JENT_EVARVAR; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Ensure that we have variations in the time stamp below 10 for at | 
|  | * least 10% of all checks -- on some platforms, the counter increments | 
|  | * in multiples of 100, but not always | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if ((TESTLOOPCOUNT/10 * 9) < count_mod) | 
|  | return JENT_ECOARSETIME; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * If we have more than 90% stuck results, then this Jitter RNG is | 
|  | * likely to not work well. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if ((TESTLOOPCOUNT/10 * 9) < count_stuck) | 
|  | return JENT_ESTUCK; | 
|  |  | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } |