| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only | 
 | /* | 
 |  * Copyright 2002-2005, Instant802 Networks, Inc. | 
 |  * Copyright 2005-2006, Devicescape Software, Inc. | 
 |  * Copyright 2006-2007	Jiri Benc <jbenc@suse.cz> | 
 |  * Copyright 2007-2008	Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> | 
 |  * Copyright 2013-2014  Intel Mobile Communications GmbH | 
 |  * Copyright 2015-2017	Intel Deutschland GmbH | 
 |  * Copyright 2018-2020, 2022-2023  Intel Corporation | 
 |  */ | 
 |  | 
 | #include <crypto/utils.h> | 
 | #include <linux/if_ether.h> | 
 | #include <linux/etherdevice.h> | 
 | #include <linux/list.h> | 
 | #include <linux/rcupdate.h> | 
 | #include <linux/rtnetlink.h> | 
 | #include <linux/slab.h> | 
 | #include <linux/export.h> | 
 | #include <net/mac80211.h> | 
 | #include <linux/unaligned.h> | 
 | #include "ieee80211_i.h" | 
 | #include "driver-ops.h" | 
 | #include "debugfs_key.h" | 
 | #include "aes_ccm.h" | 
 | #include "aes_cmac.h" | 
 | #include "aes_gmac.h" | 
 | #include "aes_gcm.h" | 
 |  | 
 |  | 
 | /** | 
 |  * DOC: Key handling basics | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Key handling in mac80211 is done based on per-interface (sub_if_data) | 
 |  * keys and per-station keys. Since each station belongs to an interface, | 
 |  * each station key also belongs to that interface. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Hardware acceleration is done on a best-effort basis for algorithms | 
 |  * that are implemented in software,  for each key the hardware is asked | 
 |  * to enable that key for offloading but if it cannot do that the key is | 
 |  * simply kept for software encryption (unless it is for an algorithm | 
 |  * that isn't implemented in software). | 
 |  * There is currently no way of knowing whether a key is handled in SW | 
 |  * or HW except by looking into debugfs. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * All key management is internally protected by a mutex. Within all | 
 |  * other parts of mac80211, key references are, just as STA structure | 
 |  * references, protected by RCU. Note, however, that some things are | 
 |  * unprotected, namely the key->sta dereferences within the hardware | 
 |  * acceleration functions. This means that sta_info_destroy() must | 
 |  * remove the key which waits for an RCU grace period. | 
 |  */ | 
 |  | 
 | static const u8 bcast_addr[ETH_ALEN] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF }; | 
 |  | 
 | static void | 
 | update_vlan_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int delta) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *vlan; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) | 
 | 		return; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt is protected by this */ | 
 | 	lockdep_assert_wiphy(sdata->local->hw.wiphy); | 
 |  | 
 | 	rcu_read_lock(); | 
 |  | 
 | 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list) | 
 | 		vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt += delta; | 
 |  | 
 | 	rcu_read_unlock(); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static void increment_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) | 
 | { | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * When this count is zero, SKB resizing for allocating tailroom | 
 | 	 * for IV or MMIC is skipped. But, this check has created two race | 
 | 	 * cases in xmit path while transiting from zero count to one: | 
 | 	 * | 
 | 	 * 1. SKB resize was skipped because no key was added but just before | 
 | 	 * the xmit key is added and SW encryption kicks off. | 
 | 	 * | 
 | 	 * 2. SKB resize was skipped because all the keys were hw planted but | 
 | 	 * just before xmit one of the key is deleted and SW encryption kicks | 
 | 	 * off. | 
 | 	 * | 
 | 	 * In both the above case SW encryption will find not enough space for | 
 | 	 * tailroom and exits with WARN_ON. (See WARN_ONs at wpa.c) | 
 | 	 * | 
 | 	 * Solution has been explained at | 
 | 	 * http://mid.gmane.org/1308590980.4322.19.camel@jlt3.sipsolutions.net | 
 | 	 */ | 
 |  | 
 | 	lockdep_assert_wiphy(sdata->local->hw.wiphy); | 
 |  | 
 | 	update_vlan_tailroom_need_count(sdata, 1); | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (!sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt++) { | 
 | 		/* | 
 | 		 * Flush all XMIT packets currently using HW encryption or no | 
 | 		 * encryption at all if the count transition is from 0 -> 1. | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		synchronize_net(); | 
 | 	} | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static void decrease_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, | 
 | 					 int delta) | 
 | { | 
 | 	lockdep_assert_wiphy(sdata->local->hw.wiphy); | 
 |  | 
 | 	WARN_ON_ONCE(sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt < delta); | 
 |  | 
 | 	update_vlan_tailroom_need_count(sdata, -delta); | 
 | 	sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt -= delta; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static int ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = key->sdata; | 
 | 	struct sta_info *sta; | 
 | 	int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; | 
 |  | 
 | 	might_sleep(); | 
 | 	lockdep_assert_wiphy(key->local->hw.wiphy); | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_TAINTED) { | 
 | 		/* If we get here, it's during resume and the key is | 
 | 		 * tainted so shouldn't be used/programmed any more. | 
 | 		 * However, its flags may still indicate that it was | 
 | 		 * programmed into the device (since we're in resume) | 
 | 		 * so clear that flag now to avoid trying to remove | 
 | 		 * it again later. | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE && | 
 | 		    !(key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC | | 
 | 					 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE | | 
 | 					 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM))) | 
 | 			increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata); | 
 |  | 
 | 		key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE; | 
 | 		return -EINVAL; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (!key->local->ops->set_key) | 
 | 		goto out_unsupported; | 
 |  | 
 | 	sta = key->sta; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * If this is a per-STA GTK, check if it | 
 | 	 * is supported; if not, return. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	if (sta && !(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE) && | 
 | 	    !ieee80211_hw_check(&key->local->hw, SUPPORTS_PER_STA_GTK)) | 
 | 		goto out_unsupported; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (sta && !sta->uploaded) | 
 | 		goto out_unsupported; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) { | 
 | 		/* | 
 | 		 * The driver doesn't know anything about VLAN interfaces. | 
 | 		 * Hence, don't send GTKs for VLAN interfaces to the driver. | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		if (!(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE)) { | 
 | 			ret = 1; | 
 | 			goto out_unsupported; | 
 | 		} | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (key->conf.link_id >= 0 && sdata->vif.active_links && | 
 | 	    !(sdata->vif.active_links & BIT(key->conf.link_id))) | 
 | 		return 0; | 
 |  | 
 | 	ret = drv_set_key(key->local, SET_KEY, sdata, | 
 | 			  sta ? &sta->sta : NULL, &key->conf); | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (!ret) { | 
 | 		key->flags |= KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE; | 
 |  | 
 | 		if (!(key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC | | 
 | 					 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE | | 
 | 					 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM))) | 
 | 			decrease_tailroom_need_count(sdata, 1); | 
 |  | 
 | 		WARN_ON((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) && | 
 | 			(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)); | 
 |  | 
 | 		WARN_ON((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE) && | 
 | 			(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC)); | 
 |  | 
 | 		return 0; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (ret != -ENOSPC && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP && ret != 1) | 
 | 		sdata_err(sdata, | 
 | 			  "failed to set key (%d, %pM) to hardware (%d)\n", | 
 | 			  key->conf.keyidx, | 
 | 			  sta ? sta->sta.addr : bcast_addr, ret); | 
 |  | 
 |  out_unsupported: | 
 | 	switch (key->conf.cipher) { | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256: | 
 | 		/* all of these we can do in software - if driver can */ | 
 | 		if (ret == 1) | 
 | 			return 0; | 
 | 		if (ieee80211_hw_check(&key->local->hw, SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL)) | 
 | 			return -EINVAL; | 
 | 		return 0; | 
 | 	default: | 
 | 		return -EINVAL; | 
 | 	} | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static void ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata; | 
 | 	struct sta_info *sta; | 
 | 	int ret; | 
 |  | 
 | 	might_sleep(); | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (!key || !key->local->ops->set_key) | 
 | 		return; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (!(key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE)) | 
 | 		return; | 
 |  | 
 | 	sta = key->sta; | 
 | 	sdata = key->sdata; | 
 |  | 
 | 	lockdep_assert_wiphy(key->local->hw.wiphy); | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (key->conf.link_id >= 0 && sdata->vif.active_links && | 
 | 	    !(sdata->vif.active_links & BIT(key->conf.link_id))) | 
 | 		return; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (!(key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC | | 
 | 				 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE | | 
 | 				 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM))) | 
 | 		increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata); | 
 |  | 
 | 	key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE; | 
 | 	ret = drv_set_key(key->local, DISABLE_KEY, sdata, | 
 | 			  sta ? &sta->sta : NULL, &key->conf); | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (ret) | 
 | 		sdata_err(sdata, | 
 | 			  "failed to remove key (%d, %pM) from hardware (%d)\n", | 
 | 			  key->conf.keyidx, | 
 | 			  sta ? sta->sta.addr : bcast_addr, ret); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static int _ieee80211_set_tx_key(struct ieee80211_key *key, bool force) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct sta_info *sta = key->sta; | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_local *local = key->local; | 
 |  | 
 | 	lockdep_assert_wiphy(local->hw.wiphy); | 
 |  | 
 | 	set_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_USES_ENCRYPTION); | 
 |  | 
 | 	sta->ptk_idx = key->conf.keyidx; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (force || !ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, AMPDU_KEYBORDER_SUPPORT)) | 
 | 		clear_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA); | 
 | 	ieee80211_check_fast_xmit(sta); | 
 |  | 
 | 	return 0; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | int ieee80211_set_tx_key(struct ieee80211_key *key) | 
 | { | 
 | 	return _ieee80211_set_tx_key(key, false); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static void ieee80211_pairwise_rekey(struct ieee80211_key *old, | 
 | 				     struct ieee80211_key *new) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_local *local = new->local; | 
 | 	struct sta_info *sta = new->sta; | 
 | 	int i; | 
 |  | 
 | 	lockdep_assert_wiphy(local->hw.wiphy); | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (new->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX) { | 
 | 		/* Extended Key ID key install, initial one or rekey */ | 
 |  | 
 | 		if (sta->ptk_idx != INVALID_PTK_KEYIDX && | 
 | 		    !ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, AMPDU_KEYBORDER_SUPPORT)) { | 
 | 			/* Aggregation Sessions with Extended Key ID must not | 
 | 			 * mix MPDUs with different keyIDs within one A-MPDU. | 
 | 			 * Tear down running Tx aggregation sessions and block | 
 | 			 * new Rx/Tx aggregation requests during rekey to | 
 | 			 * ensure there are no A-MPDUs when the driver is not | 
 | 			 * supporting A-MPDU key borders. (Blocking Tx only | 
 | 			 * would be sufficient but WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA gets the | 
 | 			 * job done for the few ms we need it.) | 
 | 			 */ | 
 | 			set_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA); | 
 | 			for (i = 0; i <  IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; i++) | 
 | 				__ieee80211_stop_tx_ba_session(sta, i, | 
 | 							       AGG_STOP_LOCAL_REQUEST); | 
 | 		} | 
 | 	} else if (old) { | 
 | 		/* Rekey without Extended Key ID. | 
 | 		 * Aggregation sessions are OK when running on SW crypto. | 
 | 		 * A broken remote STA may cause issues not observed with HW | 
 | 		 * crypto, though. | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		if (!(old->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE)) | 
 | 			return; | 
 |  | 
 | 		/* Stop Tx till we are on the new key */ | 
 | 		old->flags |= KEY_FLAG_TAINTED; | 
 | 		ieee80211_clear_fast_xmit(sta); | 
 | 		if (ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, AMPDU_AGGREGATION)) { | 
 | 			set_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA); | 
 | 			ieee80211_sta_tear_down_BA_sessions(sta, | 
 | 							    AGG_STOP_LOCAL_REQUEST); | 
 | 		} | 
 | 		if (!wiphy_ext_feature_isset(local->hw.wiphy, | 
 | 					     NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0)) { | 
 | 			pr_warn_ratelimited("Rekeying PTK for STA %pM but driver can't safely do that.", | 
 | 					    sta->sta.addr); | 
 | 			/* Flushing the driver queues *may* help prevent | 
 | 			 * the clear text leaks and freezes. | 
 | 			 */ | 
 | 			ieee80211_flush_queues(local, old->sdata, false); | 
 | 		} | 
 | 	} | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static void __ieee80211_set_default_key(struct ieee80211_link_data *link, | 
 | 					int idx, bool uni, bool multi) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = link->sdata; | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL; | 
 |  | 
 | 	lockdep_assert_wiphy(sdata->local->hw.wiphy); | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (idx >= 0 && idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS) { | 
 | 		key = wiphy_dereference(sdata->local->hw.wiphy, | 
 | 					sdata->keys[idx]); | 
 | 		if (!key) | 
 | 			key = wiphy_dereference(sdata->local->hw.wiphy, | 
 | 						link->gtk[idx]); | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (uni) { | 
 | 		rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->default_unicast_key, key); | 
 | 		ieee80211_check_fast_xmit_iface(sdata); | 
 | 		if (sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) | 
 | 			drv_set_default_unicast_key(sdata->local, sdata, idx); | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (multi) | 
 | 		rcu_assign_pointer(link->default_multicast_key, key); | 
 |  | 
 | 	ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | void ieee80211_set_default_key(struct ieee80211_link_data *link, int idx, | 
 | 			       bool uni, bool multi) | 
 | { | 
 | 	lockdep_assert_wiphy(link->sdata->local->hw.wiphy); | 
 |  | 
 | 	__ieee80211_set_default_key(link, idx, uni, multi); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static void | 
 | __ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(struct ieee80211_link_data *link, int idx) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = link->sdata; | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL; | 
 |  | 
 | 	lockdep_assert_wiphy(sdata->local->hw.wiphy); | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS && | 
 | 	    idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS) | 
 | 		key = wiphy_dereference(sdata->local->hw.wiphy, | 
 | 					link->gtk[idx]); | 
 |  | 
 | 	rcu_assign_pointer(link->default_mgmt_key, key); | 
 |  | 
 | 	ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | void ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(struct ieee80211_link_data *link, | 
 | 				    int idx) | 
 | { | 
 | 	lockdep_assert_wiphy(link->sdata->local->hw.wiphy); | 
 |  | 
 | 	__ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(link, idx); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static void | 
 | __ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(struct ieee80211_link_data *link, int idx) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = link->sdata; | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL; | 
 |  | 
 | 	lockdep_assert_wiphy(sdata->local->hw.wiphy); | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS && | 
 | 	    idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS + | 
 | 	    NUM_DEFAULT_BEACON_KEYS) | 
 | 		key = wiphy_dereference(sdata->local->hw.wiphy, | 
 | 					link->gtk[idx]); | 
 |  | 
 | 	rcu_assign_pointer(link->default_beacon_key, key); | 
 |  | 
 | 	ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | void ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(struct ieee80211_link_data *link, | 
 | 				      int idx) | 
 | { | 
 | 	lockdep_assert_wiphy(link->sdata->local->hw.wiphy); | 
 |  | 
 | 	__ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(link, idx); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static int ieee80211_key_replace(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, | 
 | 				 struct ieee80211_link_data *link, | 
 | 				 struct sta_info *sta, | 
 | 				 bool pairwise, | 
 | 				 struct ieee80211_key *old, | 
 | 				 struct ieee80211_key *new) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct link_sta_info *link_sta = sta ? &sta->deflink : NULL; | 
 | 	int link_id; | 
 | 	int idx; | 
 | 	int ret = 0; | 
 | 	bool defunikey, defmultikey, defmgmtkey, defbeaconkey; | 
 | 	bool is_wep; | 
 |  | 
 | 	lockdep_assert_wiphy(sdata->local->hw.wiphy); | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* caller must provide at least one old/new */ | 
 | 	if (WARN_ON(!new && !old)) | 
 | 		return 0; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (new) { | 
 | 		idx = new->conf.keyidx; | 
 | 		is_wep = new->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40 || | 
 | 			 new->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104; | 
 | 		link_id = new->conf.link_id; | 
 | 	} else { | 
 | 		idx = old->conf.keyidx; | 
 | 		is_wep = old->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40 || | 
 | 			 old->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104; | 
 | 		link_id = old->conf.link_id; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (WARN(old && old->conf.link_id != link_id, | 
 | 		 "old link ID %d doesn't match new link ID %d\n", | 
 | 		 old->conf.link_id, link_id)) | 
 | 		return -EINVAL; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (link_id >= 0) { | 
 | 		if (!link) { | 
 | 			link = sdata_dereference(sdata->link[link_id], sdata); | 
 | 			if (!link) | 
 | 				return -ENOLINK; | 
 | 		} | 
 |  | 
 | 		if (sta) { | 
 | 			link_sta = rcu_dereference_protected(sta->link[link_id], | 
 | 							     lockdep_is_held(&sta->local->hw.wiphy->mtx)); | 
 | 			if (!link_sta) | 
 | 				return -ENOLINK; | 
 | 		} | 
 | 	} else { | 
 | 		link = &sdata->deflink; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	if ((is_wep || pairwise) && idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS) | 
 | 		return -EINVAL; | 
 |  | 
 | 	WARN_ON(new && old && new->conf.keyidx != old->conf.keyidx); | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (new && sta && pairwise) { | 
 | 		/* Unicast rekey needs special handling. With Extended Key ID | 
 | 		 * old is still NULL for the first rekey. | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		ieee80211_pairwise_rekey(old, new); | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (old) { | 
 | 		if (old->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) { | 
 | 			ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(old); | 
 |  | 
 | 			if (new) | 
 | 				ret = ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(new); | 
 | 		} | 
 | 	} else { | 
 | 		if (!new->local->wowlan) | 
 | 			ret = ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(new); | 
 | 		else | 
 | 			new->flags |= KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (ret) | 
 | 		return ret; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (new) | 
 | 		list_add_tail_rcu(&new->list, &sdata->key_list); | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (sta) { | 
 | 		if (pairwise) { | 
 | 			rcu_assign_pointer(sta->ptk[idx], new); | 
 | 			if (new && | 
 | 			    !(new->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX)) | 
 | 				_ieee80211_set_tx_key(new, true); | 
 | 		} else { | 
 | 			rcu_assign_pointer(link_sta->gtk[idx], new); | 
 | 		} | 
 | 		/* Only needed for transition from no key -> key. | 
 | 		 * Still triggers unnecessary when using Extended Key ID | 
 | 		 * and installing the second key ID the first time. | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		if (new && !old) | 
 | 			ieee80211_check_fast_rx(sta); | 
 | 	} else { | 
 | 		defunikey = old && | 
 | 			old == wiphy_dereference(sdata->local->hw.wiphy, | 
 | 						 sdata->default_unicast_key); | 
 | 		defmultikey = old && | 
 | 			old == wiphy_dereference(sdata->local->hw.wiphy, | 
 | 						 link->default_multicast_key); | 
 | 		defmgmtkey = old && | 
 | 			old == wiphy_dereference(sdata->local->hw.wiphy, | 
 | 						 link->default_mgmt_key); | 
 | 		defbeaconkey = old && | 
 | 			old == wiphy_dereference(sdata->local->hw.wiphy, | 
 | 						 link->default_beacon_key); | 
 |  | 
 | 		if (defunikey && !new) | 
 | 			__ieee80211_set_default_key(link, -1, true, false); | 
 | 		if (defmultikey && !new) | 
 | 			__ieee80211_set_default_key(link, -1, false, true); | 
 | 		if (defmgmtkey && !new) | 
 | 			__ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(link, -1); | 
 | 		if (defbeaconkey && !new) | 
 | 			__ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(link, -1); | 
 |  | 
 | 		if (is_wep || pairwise) | 
 | 			rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->keys[idx], new); | 
 | 		else | 
 | 			rcu_assign_pointer(link->gtk[idx], new); | 
 |  | 
 | 		if (defunikey && new) | 
 | 			__ieee80211_set_default_key(link, new->conf.keyidx, | 
 | 						    true, false); | 
 | 		if (defmultikey && new) | 
 | 			__ieee80211_set_default_key(link, new->conf.keyidx, | 
 | 						    false, true); | 
 | 		if (defmgmtkey && new) | 
 | 			__ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(link, | 
 | 							 new->conf.keyidx); | 
 | 		if (defbeaconkey && new) | 
 | 			__ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(link, | 
 | 							   new->conf.keyidx); | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (old) | 
 | 		list_del_rcu(&old->list); | 
 |  | 
 | 	return 0; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | struct ieee80211_key * | 
 | ieee80211_key_alloc(u32 cipher, int idx, size_t key_len, | 
 | 		    const u8 *key_data, | 
 | 		    size_t seq_len, const u8 *seq) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_key *key; | 
 | 	int i, j, err; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (WARN_ON(idx < 0 || | 
 | 		    idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS + | 
 | 		    NUM_DEFAULT_BEACON_KEYS)) | 
 | 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); | 
 |  | 
 | 	key = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ieee80211_key) + key_len, GFP_KERNEL); | 
 | 	if (!key) | 
 | 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * Default to software encryption; we'll later upload the | 
 | 	 * key to the hardware if possible. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	key->conf.flags = 0; | 
 | 	key->flags = 0; | 
 |  | 
 | 	key->conf.link_id = -1; | 
 | 	key->conf.cipher = cipher; | 
 | 	key->conf.keyidx = idx; | 
 | 	key->conf.keylen = key_len; | 
 | 	switch (cipher) { | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104: | 
 | 		key->conf.iv_len = IEEE80211_WEP_IV_LEN; | 
 | 		key->conf.icv_len = IEEE80211_WEP_ICV_LEN; | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP: | 
 | 		key->conf.iv_len = IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN; | 
 | 		key->conf.icv_len = IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN; | 
 | 		if (seq) { | 
 | 			for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; i++) { | 
 | 				key->u.tkip.rx[i].iv32 = | 
 | 					get_unaligned_le32(&seq[2]); | 
 | 				key->u.tkip.rx[i].iv16 = | 
 | 					get_unaligned_le16(seq); | 
 | 			} | 
 | 		} | 
 | 		spin_lock_init(&key->u.tkip.txlock); | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP: | 
 | 		key->conf.iv_len = IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN; | 
 | 		key->conf.icv_len = IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN; | 
 | 		if (seq) { | 
 | 			for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1; i++) | 
 | 				for (j = 0; j < IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN; j++) | 
 | 					key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[i][j] = | 
 | 						seq[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN - j - 1]; | 
 | 		} | 
 | 		/* | 
 | 		 * Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that | 
 | 		 * it does not need to be initialized for every packet. | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		key->u.ccmp.tfm = ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt( | 
 | 			key_data, key_len, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN); | 
 | 		if (IS_ERR(key->u.ccmp.tfm)) { | 
 | 			err = PTR_ERR(key->u.ccmp.tfm); | 
 | 			kfree(key); | 
 | 			return ERR_PTR(err); | 
 | 		} | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256: | 
 | 		key->conf.iv_len = IEEE80211_CCMP_256_HDR_LEN; | 
 | 		key->conf.icv_len = IEEE80211_CCMP_256_MIC_LEN; | 
 | 		for (i = 0; seq && i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1; i++) | 
 | 			for (j = 0; j < IEEE80211_CCMP_256_PN_LEN; j++) | 
 | 				key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[i][j] = | 
 | 					seq[IEEE80211_CCMP_256_PN_LEN - j - 1]; | 
 | 		/* Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that | 
 | 		 * it does not need to be initialized for every packet. | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		key->u.ccmp.tfm = ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt( | 
 | 			key_data, key_len, IEEE80211_CCMP_256_MIC_LEN); | 
 | 		if (IS_ERR(key->u.ccmp.tfm)) { | 
 | 			err = PTR_ERR(key->u.ccmp.tfm); | 
 | 			kfree(key); | 
 | 			return ERR_PTR(err); | 
 | 		} | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256: | 
 | 		key->conf.iv_len = 0; | 
 | 		if (cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC) | 
 | 			key->conf.icv_len = sizeof(struct ieee80211_mmie); | 
 | 		else | 
 | 			key->conf.icv_len = sizeof(struct ieee80211_mmie_16); | 
 | 		if (seq) | 
 | 			for (j = 0; j < IEEE80211_CMAC_PN_LEN; j++) | 
 | 				key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn[j] = | 
 | 					seq[IEEE80211_CMAC_PN_LEN - j - 1]; | 
 | 		/* | 
 | 		 * Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that | 
 | 		 * it does not need to be initialized for every packet. | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		key->u.aes_cmac.tfm = | 
 | 			ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_setup(key_data, key_len); | 
 | 		if (IS_ERR(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm)) { | 
 | 			err = PTR_ERR(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm); | 
 | 			kfree(key); | 
 | 			return ERR_PTR(err); | 
 | 		} | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256: | 
 | 		key->conf.iv_len = 0; | 
 | 		key->conf.icv_len = sizeof(struct ieee80211_mmie_16); | 
 | 		if (seq) | 
 | 			for (j = 0; j < IEEE80211_GMAC_PN_LEN; j++) | 
 | 				key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn[j] = | 
 | 					seq[IEEE80211_GMAC_PN_LEN - j - 1]; | 
 | 		/* Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that | 
 | 		 * it does not need to be initialized for every packet. | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		key->u.aes_gmac.tfm = | 
 | 			ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_setup(key_data, key_len); | 
 | 		if (IS_ERR(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm)) { | 
 | 			err = PTR_ERR(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm); | 
 | 			kfree(key); | 
 | 			return ERR_PTR(err); | 
 | 		} | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256: | 
 | 		key->conf.iv_len = IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN; | 
 | 		key->conf.icv_len = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN; | 
 | 		for (i = 0; seq && i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1; i++) | 
 | 			for (j = 0; j < IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN; j++) | 
 | 				key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[i][j] = | 
 | 					seq[IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN - j - 1]; | 
 | 		/* Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that | 
 | 		 * it does not need to be initialized for every packet. | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		key->u.gcmp.tfm = ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_setup_encrypt(key_data, | 
 | 								      key_len); | 
 | 		if (IS_ERR(key->u.gcmp.tfm)) { | 
 | 			err = PTR_ERR(key->u.gcmp.tfm); | 
 | 			kfree(key); | 
 | 			return ERR_PTR(err); | 
 | 		} | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	} | 
 | 	memcpy(key->conf.key, key_data, key_len); | 
 | 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&key->list); | 
 |  | 
 | 	return key; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static void ieee80211_key_free_common(struct ieee80211_key *key) | 
 | { | 
 | 	switch (key->conf.cipher) { | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256: | 
 | 		ieee80211_aes_key_free(key->u.ccmp.tfm); | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256: | 
 | 		ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_free(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm); | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256: | 
 | 		ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_free(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm); | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256: | 
 | 		ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_free(key->u.gcmp.tfm); | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	} | 
 | 	kfree_sensitive(key); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static void __ieee80211_key_destroy(struct ieee80211_key *key, | 
 | 				    bool delay_tailroom) | 
 | { | 
 | 	if (key->local) { | 
 | 		struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = key->sdata; | 
 |  | 
 | 		ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove(key); | 
 |  | 
 | 		if (delay_tailroom) { | 
 | 			/* see ieee80211_delayed_tailroom_dec */ | 
 | 			sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec++; | 
 | 			wiphy_delayed_work_queue(sdata->local->hw.wiphy, | 
 | 						 &sdata->dec_tailroom_needed_wk, | 
 | 						 HZ / 2); | 
 | 		} else { | 
 | 			decrease_tailroom_need_count(sdata, 1); | 
 | 		} | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	ieee80211_key_free_common(key); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static void ieee80211_key_destroy(struct ieee80211_key *key, | 
 | 				  bool delay_tailroom) | 
 | { | 
 | 	if (!key) | 
 | 		return; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * Synchronize so the TX path and rcu key iterators | 
 | 	 * can no longer be using this key before we free/remove it. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	synchronize_net(); | 
 |  | 
 | 	__ieee80211_key_destroy(key, delay_tailroom); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | void ieee80211_key_free_unused(struct ieee80211_key *key) | 
 | { | 
 | 	if (!key) | 
 | 		return; | 
 |  | 
 | 	WARN_ON(key->sdata || key->local); | 
 | 	ieee80211_key_free_common(key); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static bool ieee80211_key_identical(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, | 
 | 				    struct ieee80211_key *old, | 
 | 				    struct ieee80211_key *new) | 
 | { | 
 | 	u8 tkip_old[WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP], tkip_new[WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP]; | 
 | 	u8 *tk_old, *tk_new; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (!old || new->conf.keylen != old->conf.keylen) | 
 | 		return false; | 
 |  | 
 | 	tk_old = old->conf.key; | 
 | 	tk_new = new->conf.key; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * In station mode, don't compare the TX MIC key, as it's never used | 
 | 	 * and offloaded rekeying may not care to send it to the host. This | 
 | 	 * is the case in iwlwifi, for example. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION && | 
 | 	    new->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP && | 
 | 	    new->conf.keylen == WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP && | 
 | 	    !(new->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE)) { | 
 | 		memcpy(tkip_old, tk_old, WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP); | 
 | 		memcpy(tkip_new, tk_new, WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP); | 
 | 		memset(tkip_old + NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY, 0, 8); | 
 | 		memset(tkip_new + NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY, 0, 8); | 
 | 		tk_old = tkip_old; | 
 | 		tk_new = tkip_new; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	return !crypto_memneq(tk_old, tk_new, new->conf.keylen); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key *key, | 
 | 		       struct ieee80211_link_data *link, | 
 | 		       struct sta_info *sta) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = link->sdata; | 
 | 	static atomic_t key_color = ATOMIC_INIT(0); | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_key *old_key = NULL; | 
 | 	int idx = key->conf.keyidx; | 
 | 	bool pairwise = key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE; | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * We want to delay tailroom updates only for station - in that | 
 | 	 * case it helps roaming speed, but in other cases it hurts and | 
 | 	 * can cause warnings to appear. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	bool delay_tailroom = sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION; | 
 | 	int ret; | 
 |  | 
 | 	lockdep_assert_wiphy(sdata->local->hw.wiphy); | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (sta && pairwise) { | 
 | 		struct ieee80211_key *alt_key; | 
 |  | 
 | 		old_key = wiphy_dereference(sdata->local->hw.wiphy, | 
 | 					    sta->ptk[idx]); | 
 | 		alt_key = wiphy_dereference(sdata->local->hw.wiphy, | 
 | 					    sta->ptk[idx ^ 1]); | 
 |  | 
 | 		/* The rekey code assumes that the old and new key are using | 
 | 		 * the same cipher. Enforce the assumption for pairwise keys. | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		if ((alt_key && alt_key->conf.cipher != key->conf.cipher) || | 
 | 		    (old_key && old_key->conf.cipher != key->conf.cipher)) { | 
 | 			ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; | 
 | 			goto out; | 
 | 		} | 
 | 	} else if (sta) { | 
 | 		struct link_sta_info *link_sta = &sta->deflink; | 
 | 		int link_id = key->conf.link_id; | 
 |  | 
 | 		if (link_id >= 0) { | 
 | 			link_sta = rcu_dereference_protected(sta->link[link_id], | 
 | 							     lockdep_is_held(&sta->local->hw.wiphy->mtx)); | 
 | 			if (!link_sta) { | 
 | 				ret = -ENOLINK; | 
 | 				goto out; | 
 | 			} | 
 | 		} | 
 |  | 
 | 		old_key = wiphy_dereference(sdata->local->hw.wiphy, | 
 | 					    link_sta->gtk[idx]); | 
 | 	} else { | 
 | 		if (idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS) | 
 | 			old_key = wiphy_dereference(sdata->local->hw.wiphy, | 
 | 						    sdata->keys[idx]); | 
 | 		if (!old_key) | 
 | 			old_key = wiphy_dereference(sdata->local->hw.wiphy, | 
 | 						    link->gtk[idx]); | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* Non-pairwise keys must also not switch the cipher on rekey */ | 
 | 	if (!pairwise) { | 
 | 		if (old_key && old_key->conf.cipher != key->conf.cipher) { | 
 | 			ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; | 
 | 			goto out; | 
 | 		} | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * Silently accept key re-installation without really installing the | 
 | 	 * new version of the key to avoid nonce reuse or replay issues. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	if (ieee80211_key_identical(sdata, old_key, key)) { | 
 | 		ret = -EALREADY; | 
 | 		goto out; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	key->local = sdata->local; | 
 | 	key->sdata = sdata; | 
 | 	key->sta = sta; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * Assign a unique ID to every key so we can easily prevent mixed | 
 | 	 * key and fragment cache attacks. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	key->color = atomic_inc_return(&key_color); | 
 |  | 
 | 	increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata); | 
 |  | 
 | 	ret = ieee80211_key_replace(sdata, link, sta, pairwise, old_key, key); | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (!ret) { | 
 | 		ieee80211_debugfs_key_add(key); | 
 | 		ieee80211_key_destroy(old_key, delay_tailroom); | 
 | 	} else { | 
 | 		ieee80211_key_free(key, delay_tailroom); | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	key = NULL; | 
 |  | 
 |  out: | 
 | 	ieee80211_key_free_unused(key); | 
 | 	return ret; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | void ieee80211_key_free(struct ieee80211_key *key, bool delay_tailroom) | 
 | { | 
 | 	if (!key) | 
 | 		return; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * Replace key with nothingness if it was ever used. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	if (key->sdata) | 
 | 		ieee80211_key_replace(key->sdata, NULL, key->sta, | 
 | 				      key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE, | 
 | 				      key, NULL); | 
 | 	ieee80211_key_destroy(key, delay_tailroom); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | void ieee80211_reenable_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_key *key; | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *vlan; | 
 |  | 
 | 	lockdep_assert_wiphy(sdata->local->hw.wiphy); | 
 |  | 
 | 	sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt = 0; | 
 | 	sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 0; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) { | 
 | 		list_for_each_entry(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list) { | 
 | 			vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt = 0; | 
 | 			vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 0; | 
 | 		} | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (ieee80211_sdata_running(sdata)) { | 
 | 		list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list) { | 
 | 			increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata); | 
 | 			ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(key); | 
 | 		} | 
 | 	} | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | void ieee80211_iter_keys(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, | 
 | 			 struct ieee80211_vif *vif, | 
 | 			 void (*iter)(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, | 
 | 				      struct ieee80211_vif *vif, | 
 | 				      struct ieee80211_sta *sta, | 
 | 				      struct ieee80211_key_conf *key, | 
 | 				      void *data), | 
 | 			 void *iter_data) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_local *local = hw_to_local(hw); | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_key *key, *tmp; | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata; | 
 |  | 
 | 	lockdep_assert_wiphy(hw->wiphy); | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (vif) { | 
 | 		sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif); | 
 | 		list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp, &sdata->key_list, list) | 
 | 			iter(hw, &sdata->vif, | 
 | 			     key->sta ? &key->sta->sta : NULL, | 
 | 			     &key->conf, iter_data); | 
 | 	} else { | 
 | 		list_for_each_entry(sdata, &local->interfaces, list) | 
 | 			list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp, | 
 | 						 &sdata->key_list, list) | 
 | 				iter(hw, &sdata->vif, | 
 | 				     key->sta ? &key->sta->sta : NULL, | 
 | 				     &key->conf, iter_data); | 
 | 	} | 
 | } | 
 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_iter_keys); | 
 |  | 
 | static void | 
 | _ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, | 
 | 			 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, | 
 | 			 void (*iter)(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, | 
 | 				      struct ieee80211_vif *vif, | 
 | 				      struct ieee80211_sta *sta, | 
 | 				      struct ieee80211_key_conf *key, | 
 | 				      void *data), | 
 | 			 void *iter_data) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_key *key; | 
 |  | 
 | 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &sdata->key_list, list) { | 
 | 		/* skip keys of station in removal process */ | 
 | 		if (key->sta && key->sta->removed) | 
 | 			continue; | 
 | 		if (!(key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE)) | 
 | 			continue; | 
 |  | 
 | 		iter(hw, &sdata->vif, | 
 | 		     key->sta ? &key->sta->sta : NULL, | 
 | 		     &key->conf, iter_data); | 
 | 	} | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | void ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, | 
 | 			     struct ieee80211_vif *vif, | 
 | 			     void (*iter)(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, | 
 | 					  struct ieee80211_vif *vif, | 
 | 					  struct ieee80211_sta *sta, | 
 | 					  struct ieee80211_key_conf *key, | 
 | 					  void *data), | 
 | 			     void *iter_data) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_local *local = hw_to_local(hw); | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (vif) { | 
 | 		sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif); | 
 | 		_ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu(hw, sdata, iter, iter_data); | 
 | 	} else { | 
 | 		list_for_each_entry_rcu(sdata, &local->interfaces, list) | 
 | 			_ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu(hw, sdata, iter, iter_data); | 
 | 	} | 
 | } | 
 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu); | 
 |  | 
 | static void ieee80211_free_keys_iface(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, | 
 | 				      struct list_head *keys) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_key *key, *tmp; | 
 |  | 
 | 	decrease_tailroom_need_count(sdata, | 
 | 				     sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec); | 
 | 	sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 0; | 
 |  | 
 | 	ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove_mgmt_default(sdata); | 
 | 	ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove_beacon_default(sdata); | 
 |  | 
 | 	list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp, &sdata->key_list, list) { | 
 | 		ieee80211_key_replace(key->sdata, NULL, key->sta, | 
 | 				      key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE, | 
 | 				      key, NULL); | 
 | 		list_add_tail(&key->list, keys); | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | void ieee80211_remove_link_keys(struct ieee80211_link_data *link, | 
 | 				struct list_head *keys) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = link->sdata; | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local; | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_key *key, *tmp; | 
 |  | 
 | 	lockdep_assert_wiphy(local->hw.wiphy); | 
 |  | 
 | 	list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp, &sdata->key_list, list) { | 
 | 		if (key->conf.link_id != link->link_id) | 
 | 			continue; | 
 | 		ieee80211_key_replace(key->sdata, link, key->sta, | 
 | 				      key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE, | 
 | 				      key, NULL); | 
 | 		list_add_tail(&key->list, keys); | 
 | 	} | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | void ieee80211_free_key_list(struct ieee80211_local *local, | 
 | 			     struct list_head *keys) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_key *key, *tmp; | 
 |  | 
 | 	lockdep_assert_wiphy(local->hw.wiphy); | 
 |  | 
 | 	list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp, keys, list) | 
 | 		__ieee80211_key_destroy(key, false); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | void ieee80211_free_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, | 
 | 			 bool force_synchronize) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local; | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *vlan; | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *master; | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_key *key, *tmp; | 
 | 	LIST_HEAD(keys); | 
 |  | 
 | 	wiphy_delayed_work_cancel(local->hw.wiphy, | 
 | 				  &sdata->dec_tailroom_needed_wk); | 
 |  | 
 | 	lockdep_assert_wiphy(local->hw.wiphy); | 
 |  | 
 | 	ieee80211_free_keys_iface(sdata, &keys); | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) { | 
 | 		list_for_each_entry(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list) | 
 | 			ieee80211_free_keys_iface(vlan, &keys); | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (!list_empty(&keys) || force_synchronize) | 
 | 		synchronize_net(); | 
 | 	list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp, &keys, list) | 
 | 		__ieee80211_key_destroy(key, false); | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) { | 
 | 		if (sdata->bss) { | 
 | 			master = container_of(sdata->bss, | 
 | 					      struct ieee80211_sub_if_data, | 
 | 					      u.ap); | 
 |  | 
 | 			WARN_ON_ONCE(sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt != | 
 | 				     master->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt); | 
 | 		} | 
 | 	} else { | 
 | 		WARN_ON_ONCE(sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt || | 
 | 			     sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec); | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) { | 
 | 		list_for_each_entry(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list) | 
 | 			WARN_ON_ONCE(vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt || | 
 | 				     vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec); | 
 | 	} | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | void ieee80211_free_sta_keys(struct ieee80211_local *local, | 
 | 			     struct sta_info *sta) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_key *key; | 
 | 	int i; | 
 |  | 
 | 	lockdep_assert_wiphy(local->hw.wiphy); | 
 |  | 
 | 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sta->deflink.gtk); i++) { | 
 | 		key = wiphy_dereference(local->hw.wiphy, sta->deflink.gtk[i]); | 
 | 		if (!key) | 
 | 			continue; | 
 | 		ieee80211_key_replace(key->sdata, NULL, key->sta, | 
 | 				      key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE, | 
 | 				      key, NULL); | 
 | 		__ieee80211_key_destroy(key, key->sdata->vif.type == | 
 | 					NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION); | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	for (i = 0; i < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS; i++) { | 
 | 		key = wiphy_dereference(local->hw.wiphy, sta->ptk[i]); | 
 | 		if (!key) | 
 | 			continue; | 
 | 		ieee80211_key_replace(key->sdata, NULL, key->sta, | 
 | 				      key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE, | 
 | 				      key, NULL); | 
 | 		__ieee80211_key_destroy(key, key->sdata->vif.type == | 
 | 					NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION); | 
 | 	} | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | void ieee80211_delayed_tailroom_dec(struct wiphy *wiphy, | 
 | 				    struct wiphy_work *wk) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata; | 
 |  | 
 | 	sdata = container_of(wk, struct ieee80211_sub_if_data, | 
 | 			     dec_tailroom_needed_wk.work); | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * The reason for the delayed tailroom needed decrementing is to | 
 | 	 * make roaming faster: during roaming, all keys are first deleted | 
 | 	 * and then new keys are installed. The first new key causes the | 
 | 	 * crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt to go from 0 to 1, which invokes | 
 | 	 * the cost of synchronize_net() (which can be slow). Avoid this | 
 | 	 * by deferring the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt decrementing on | 
 | 	 * key removal for a while, so if we roam the value is larger than | 
 | 	 * zero and no 0->1 transition happens. | 
 | 	 * | 
 | 	 * The cost is that if the AP switching was from an AP with keys | 
 | 	 * to one without, we still allocate tailroom while it would no | 
 | 	 * longer be needed. However, in the typical (fast) roaming case | 
 | 	 * within an ESS this usually won't happen. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 |  | 
 | 	decrease_tailroom_need_count(sdata, | 
 | 				     sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec); | 
 | 	sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 0; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | void ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify(struct ieee80211_vif *vif, const u8 *bssid, | 
 | 				const u8 *replay_ctr, gfp_t gfp) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif); | 
 |  | 
 | 	trace_api_gtk_rekey_notify(sdata, bssid, replay_ctr); | 
 |  | 
 | 	cfg80211_gtk_rekey_notify(sdata->dev, bssid, replay_ctr, gfp); | 
 | } | 
 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify); | 
 |  | 
 | void ieee80211_get_key_rx_seq(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf, | 
 | 			      int tid, struct ieee80211_key_seq *seq) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_key *key; | 
 | 	const u8 *pn; | 
 |  | 
 | 	key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf); | 
 |  | 
 | 	switch (key->conf.cipher) { | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP: | 
 | 		if (WARN_ON(tid < 0 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS)) | 
 | 			return; | 
 | 		seq->tkip.iv32 = key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv32; | 
 | 		seq->tkip.iv16 = key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv16; | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256: | 
 | 		if (WARN_ON(tid < -1 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS)) | 
 | 			return; | 
 | 		if (tid < 0) | 
 | 			pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS]; | 
 | 		else | 
 | 			pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[tid]; | 
 | 		memcpy(seq->ccmp.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256: | 
 | 		if (WARN_ON(tid != 0)) | 
 | 			return; | 
 | 		pn = key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn; | 
 | 		memcpy(seq->aes_cmac.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CMAC_PN_LEN); | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256: | 
 | 		if (WARN_ON(tid != 0)) | 
 | 			return; | 
 | 		pn = key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn; | 
 | 		memcpy(seq->aes_gmac.pn, pn, IEEE80211_GMAC_PN_LEN); | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256: | 
 | 		if (WARN_ON(tid < -1 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS)) | 
 | 			return; | 
 | 		if (tid < 0) | 
 | 			pn = key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS]; | 
 | 		else | 
 | 			pn = key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[tid]; | 
 | 		memcpy(seq->gcmp.pn, pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	} | 
 | } | 
 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_get_key_rx_seq); | 
 |  | 
 | void ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf, | 
 | 			      int tid, struct ieee80211_key_seq *seq) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_key *key; | 
 | 	u8 *pn; | 
 |  | 
 | 	key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf); | 
 |  | 
 | 	switch (key->conf.cipher) { | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP: | 
 | 		if (WARN_ON(tid < 0 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS)) | 
 | 			return; | 
 | 		key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv32 = seq->tkip.iv32; | 
 | 		key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv16 = seq->tkip.iv16; | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256: | 
 | 		if (WARN_ON(tid < -1 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS)) | 
 | 			return; | 
 | 		if (tid < 0) | 
 | 			pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS]; | 
 | 		else | 
 | 			pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[tid]; | 
 | 		memcpy(pn, seq->ccmp.pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256: | 
 | 		if (WARN_ON(tid != 0)) | 
 | 			return; | 
 | 		pn = key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn; | 
 | 		memcpy(pn, seq->aes_cmac.pn, IEEE80211_CMAC_PN_LEN); | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256: | 
 | 		if (WARN_ON(tid != 0)) | 
 | 			return; | 
 | 		pn = key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn; | 
 | 		memcpy(pn, seq->aes_gmac.pn, IEEE80211_GMAC_PN_LEN); | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256: | 
 | 		if (WARN_ON(tid < -1 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS)) | 
 | 			return; | 
 | 		if (tid < 0) | 
 | 			pn = key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS]; | 
 | 		else | 
 | 			pn = key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[tid]; | 
 | 		memcpy(pn, seq->gcmp.pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	default: | 
 | 		WARN_ON(1); | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	} | 
 | } | 
 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq); | 
 |  | 
 | void ieee80211_remove_key(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_key *key; | 
 |  | 
 | 	key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf); | 
 |  | 
 | 	lockdep_assert_wiphy(key->local->hw.wiphy); | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * if key was uploaded, we assume the driver will/has remove(d) | 
 | 	 * it, so adjust bookkeeping accordingly | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) { | 
 | 		key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE; | 
 |  | 
 | 		if (!(key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC | | 
 | 					 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE | | 
 | 					 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM))) | 
 | 			increment_tailroom_need_count(key->sdata); | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	ieee80211_key_free(key, false); | 
 | } | 
 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_remove_key); | 
 |  | 
 | struct ieee80211_key_conf * | 
 | ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add(struct ieee80211_vif *vif, | 
 | 			struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif); | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local; | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_key *key; | 
 | 	int err; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (WARN_ON(!local->wowlan)) | 
 | 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (WARN_ON(vif->type != NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION)) | 
 | 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); | 
 |  | 
 | 	key = ieee80211_key_alloc(keyconf->cipher, keyconf->keyidx, | 
 | 				  keyconf->keylen, keyconf->key, | 
 | 				  0, NULL); | 
 | 	if (IS_ERR(key)) | 
 | 		return ERR_CAST(key); | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (sdata->u.mgd.mfp != IEEE80211_MFP_DISABLED) | 
 | 		key->conf.flags |= IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RX_MGMT; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* FIXME: this function needs to get a link ID */ | 
 | 	err = ieee80211_key_link(key, &sdata->deflink, NULL); | 
 | 	if (err) | 
 | 		return ERR_PTR(err); | 
 |  | 
 | 	return &key->conf; | 
 | } | 
 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add); | 
 |  | 
 | void ieee80211_key_mic_failure(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_key *key; | 
 |  | 
 | 	key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf); | 
 |  | 
 | 	switch (key->conf.cipher) { | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256: | 
 | 		key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++; | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256: | 
 | 		key->u.aes_gmac.icverrors++; | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	default: | 
 | 		/* ignore the others for now, we don't keep counters now */ | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	} | 
 | } | 
 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_key_mic_failure); | 
 |  | 
 | void ieee80211_key_replay(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_key *key; | 
 |  | 
 | 	key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf); | 
 |  | 
 | 	switch (key->conf.cipher) { | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256: | 
 | 		key->u.ccmp.replays++; | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256: | 
 | 		key->u.aes_cmac.replays++; | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256: | 
 | 		key->u.aes_gmac.replays++; | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP: | 
 | 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256: | 
 | 		key->u.gcmp.replays++; | 
 | 		break; | 
 | 	} | 
 | } | 
 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_key_replay); | 
 |  | 
 | int ieee80211_key_switch_links(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, | 
 | 			       unsigned long del_links_mask, | 
 | 			       unsigned long add_links_mask) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ieee80211_key *key; | 
 | 	int ret; | 
 |  | 
 | 	list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list) { | 
 | 		if (key->conf.link_id < 0 || | 
 | 		    !(del_links_mask & BIT(key->conf.link_id))) | 
 | 			continue; | 
 |  | 
 | 		/* shouldn't happen for per-link keys */ | 
 | 		WARN_ON(key->sta); | 
 |  | 
 | 		ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(key); | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list) { | 
 | 		if (key->conf.link_id < 0 || | 
 | 		    !(add_links_mask & BIT(key->conf.link_id))) | 
 | 			continue; | 
 |  | 
 | 		/* shouldn't happen for per-link keys */ | 
 | 		WARN_ON(key->sta); | 
 |  | 
 | 		ret = ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(key); | 
 | 		if (ret) | 
 | 			return ret; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	return 0; | 
 | } |